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ABSTRACT 
 
Proper assessment of schizophrenia is complicated by the need for clinicians to be cognizant of 
the possibility of malingering, i.e., the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated 
symptoms, motivated by external incentives. Current standardized schizophrenia malingering 
detection methods rely on endorsement of improbable or exaggerated, mainly positive, 
symptoms. However, these detection methods may be vulnerable to successful manipulation by 
sophisticated malingerers, particularly if coached regarding response style assessment strategies. 
This paper explored the utility of supplementalvariables to examine in schizophrenia malingering 
detection by using a simulation study design to compare schizophrenia patients, a community 
participant sample instructed to feign schizophrenia symptoms, and an honest responder control 
group on behavioral speech characteristics indicative of thought disorganization (i.e., referential 
disturbances) and negative symptoms (i.e., alogia and flat affect) under experimentally-
manipulated conditions of affective reactivity and cognitive load. Results indicated that the 
feigning group was distinguishable from the schizophrenia group based on differences in 
magnitude of speech disorganization during conditions of affective reactivity, due to feigners’ 
inability to mimic the schizophrenia group’s referential failures, andin magnitude of flat affect 
during conditions of affective reactivity and cognitive load, due to feigners’ excessively impaired 
use of formant inflection(i.e., vocal inflection related to tongue movement). Feigning and 
schizophrenia groups were also distinguishable due to feigners’ excessive impairment in 
cognitive task performance, observed both in group comparisons and differential patterns of 
change in cognitive task accuracy across cognitive load conditions.   
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INTRODUCTION 
This study examined the utility of analyzing behavioral speech characteristics 
indicative of thought disorganization (i.e., referential disturbances) and negative symptoms (i.e., 
alogia and flat affect) under experimentally-manipulated conditions of affective reactivity and 
cognitive load as a potential means to increase accuracy of identification of individuals feigning 
schizophrenia, using a simulation study design.The introduction begins with a brief overview of 
schizophrenia and its heterogeneous symptom factors.  The introduction then goes on to discuss 
the issue of malingering of schizophrenia, its current methods of detection, and limitations of 
those methods.  The paper then proposes an alternative method of schizophrenia malingering 
detection to supplement the focus of existing standardized measures on self-report of improbable 
or exaggerated, mainly positive, symptoms, by examining behavioral indications of 
disorganization or negative symptoms under variable conditions of affective and cognitive load, 
using the Communications Disturbance Index (Docherty, DeRosa, & Andreasen, 1996) and 
Computerized Assessment of Natural Speech (Cohen, Hong, & Guevara, 2010; Cohen, Minor, 
Najolia, & Hong, 2009). 
Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is a massively debilitating mental disorder, with lifetime 
population prevalence estimates ranging from .5 to 1%, and estimates of economic and societal 
burdens exceeding those of most other physical and mental illnesses (Bhugra, 2005).  Typical 
age of onset ranges from late teens to mid-30s, with onset prior to adolescence very rare 
(American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2000).Schizophrenia is operationally defined by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000)by the 
presence of two or more of the following symptoms:  delusions, hallucinations, disorganized 
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speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, and negative symptoms. A well-accepted 
taxonomy of symptom clusters separates heterogeneous symptoms of schizophrenia into three 
empirically derived and validated factor domains representing positive, negative, and 
disorganization symptom complexes (see Buchanan & Carpenter, 1994, for a review of factor-
analytic studies resulting in this general symptom cluster organization model).  Positive 
symptoms include delusions, hallucinations, and inappropriate affect; negative symptoms include 
blunted affect, anhedonia, avolition, apathy, and alogia; and disorganization symptoms include 
inappropriate affect, and disorganized speech and behavior.  Clinical presentation of these 
symptoms, though, is heterogeneous, with symptom focus varying across individuals within the 
disorder (e.g., Dollfus & Brazo, 1997; Tsuang, Lyons, & Faraone, 1990).  
Researchers have not yetidentified a single disease process distinct to all 
schizophrenia patients, and various genetic and environmental risk factors identified thus far do 
not occur systematically among patients.  Instead, most current etiological theories posit a 
multifactorial thresholdmodel of inheritance, whereby a large number ofpolygenes and 
nonshared environmental experiences, not yet completely identified, haveinterchangeable and 
additive effects on the risk for schizophrenia, which is thought to develop once some additive 
threshold is reached (see Lazar, Neufeld, & Cain, 2011, for a review).  However, over the past 
two decades, researchers have begun searching for so-called  endophenotypes—markers of 
schizophrenia that are stable across symptom presentation, are present in family members, and 
represent an underlying neurological vulnerability marker for the disorder (see Allen, Griss, 
Folley, Hawkins, & Pearlson, 2009; and Lazar, et al., 2011, for reviews).  Such proposed 
endophenotypes include abnormalities in certain neuromotor functions such as smooth pursuit 
and saccadic eye movements,and deficits in neuropsychological performance onmeasures of 
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attention and executive functioning such as the Continuous Performance Test (Cornblatt, Risch, 
Faris, Friedman, & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1988) and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task(Heaton, 
1981).  As discussed in further detail below, although not yet recognized as endophenotypes, 
certainspeech characteristics such as referential disturbances(Docherty, Cohen, Nienow, Dinzeo, 
& Dangelmaier, 2003), flat affect, and alogia(Cohen, Kim, &Najolia, 2013), have shown 
promise as possible stable markers of underlying schizophrenia spectrum disorders, and may 
serve as tools to increase the accuracy of distinguishing individuals with genuine schizophrenia 
from malingerers.  
Malingering of Schizophrenia 
In addition to schizophrenia’s heterogeneous clinical presentation, proper 
assessment of the disorder is further complicated by the need for clinicians to be cognizant of the 
possibility of malingering, defined by the DSM-IV-TR as “the intentional production of false or 
grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives” 
(APA, 2000, p. 739).  These external incentives fall across two broad categories: (i) 
circumvention of difficult situations (e.g., incarceration or military service); and (ii) acquisition 
of compensation (e.g., disability benefits) or medication(Resnick & Knoll, 2008).Exact 
prevalence rates of psychosis malingering are lacking (Rogers, 2008a), in part due to 
methodological limitations in establishing rates of inherently deceptive behavior, which requires 
specific systematic application of identification procedures. In other words, it is difficult to 
establish base rates of malingering of psychosis because only those who are unsuccessful in their 
attempts to malinger can be included in prevalence estimates, and there may be more or less of 
an emphasis on systematic detection in certain environments, such as forensic versus non-
forensic populations(Resnick & Knoll, 2008).  Standard deviations in reported base rates are 
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quite high across forensic settings (SD = 14.4%; Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, & Leonard, 
1998), with prevalence estimates ranging from 10-30% to as high as 50% when certain screening 
measures are used (Rogers, 2008c). Although direct costs of malingering of psychosis cannot be 
precisely quantified due to the difficulty in establishing prevalence rates, estimated costs of 
health insurance fraud (including malingering of physical and psychological disorders) ranges 
from $59 billion (in 1995) to $150 billion (reported in 2007) annually, resulting in $1050 - $1800 
in increased premiums for the average family in America (Garriga, 2007; LoPiccolo, et al., 
1999).  In addition, malingering causes bottlenecks in the courts, and may prevent truly ill 
patients from accessing limited mental health resources (Garriga, 2007). 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that regardless of its true prevalence, rates of 
malingering may be expected to increase.  As larger numbers of mentally ill individualsfind 
themselves in situations in which mental health resources are scarce (e.g., homelessness, states in 
which community mental health funding has been drastically reduced, prison), such individuals 
may be incentivized to grossly exaggerate symptoms in order to secure treatment or housing 
(Resnick & Knoll, 2008).  With regard to this issue, it is important for clinicians not to fall prey 
to the misconception that malingering precludes the possibility that a genuine underlying 
psychological disorder is present (Resnick & Knoll, 2008; Rogers, 2008c), an issue that further 
complicates differentiation of individuals who are truly in need of care from those without a 
genuine mental illness.   
Current methods of assessment ofmalingering of schizophrenia 
The DSM-IV-TR classifies malingering as an “additional condition[] that may be 
a focus of clinical attention” (i.e., a “v-code” classification) (APA, 2000, p. 739).  It suggests that 
malingering should be “strongly suspected” if any combination of the following criteria is 
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present: (i) medicolegal context of presentation; (ii) marked discrepancy between the person’s 
claimed stress or disability and objective findings; (iii) lack of cooperation during the diagnostic 
evaluation and in complying with the prescribed treatment regimen; or (iv) the presence of 
antisocial personality disorder.  However, this “criminological model,” based on the assumption 
that malingering is an antisocial act likely to be committed by antisocial individuals, is logically 
flawed and unacceptably overestimates the presence of malingering because it merely identifies 
common characteristics of malingerers (which could also be present in non-malingering 
criminals) rather than factors that reliably distinguish malingerers from non-malingerers(Resnick 
& Knoll, 2008; Rogers, 2008b, 2008c).  In fact, the actual false-positive rate that would result 
from identification of malingerers based solely on DSM-IV-TR criteria may exceed 200% 
(Rogers, 1990, 2008b).  
Instead, Rogers (2008c)proposes that all response styles, including malingering, 
are best conceptualized within a framework of “predicted utility” of truthfulness versus 
deceptiveness (i.e., any attempts by individuals to distort or misrepresent self-report), which can 
vary from situation to situation. Due to this variability in predicted utility of deceptiveness across 
situations or even at various time points within a situation, patterns of dissimulation are therefore 
more appropriately termed “response sets,” i.e., a temporary and context-specific style, than 
“response styles,” a more enduring person-centered tendency to respond in a certain way across 
situations (Otto, 2008).  However, in order to maintain consistency with the majority of the 
malingering literature, this paper will refer to these deliberate distortions in self-report as 
“response styles,” regardless of variability across contexts. 
Given the limitations of the assessment approach indicated by suggested DSM-IV 
criteria, Rogers(2008b) proposes that proper malingering detection strategies should instead 
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utilize “a standardized method that is conceptually based and empirically validated [optimally 
through use of both simulation designs and known-groups comparisons, as explained in greater 
detail below] for systematically differentiating a specific response style (e.g., malingering or 
defensiveness) from other response styles (e.g., honest responding)” (p. 16, italics removed).(See 
also Rogers, 2008e, for an in-depth discussion of the limitations of unstandardized clinical 
malingering assessments.) Rogers’ proposal that malingering detection strategies should be 
based on empirically-validated standardized measures is consistent with the broader position of 
researchers (e.g., Grove & Meehl, 1996)who insist more generally that structured clinical 
measures are crucial for improving reliability and accuracy of diagnosis.  The importance of 
utilizing such standardized measures to bolster the accuracy of clinical judgment in the 
assessment of malingering is highlighted by the classic Rosenhan (1973)study in which eight 
individuals feigning atypical auditory hallucinations were admitted as psychiatric inpatients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and remained hospitalized for periods ranging from 9 to 52 days, 
despite the fact that they ceased simulating any psychotic symptoms upon admission.Yet a large 
portion of the literature directed to clinical practitioners regarding the detection of malingering of 
psychosis continues to focus on educating clinicians about informal detection strategies based on 
in-depth understanding of typical content and presentation style of positive psychotic symptoms 
(i.e., hallucinations and delusions) (e.g., Resnick, 1993; Resnick & Knoll, 2008).While 
understanding of typical positive symptom presentation has undoubtedly advanced since the 
Rosenhan (1973)study, many clinicians remain reluctant to identify malingering, which may be 
based in part on fear of litigation and the drastic negative consequences forindividuals 
misclassified, including denial of care and stigma (Resnick & Knoll, 2008). Again, the 
uncertainty surrounding identification of malingering of psychosis underscores the importance of 
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a systematic detection approach, as opposed to relying on a global clinical impression (Resnick 
& Knoll, 2008).  Improvement of standardized detection methods, including broadening of 
detection methods beyond the current focus of standardized measures on self-report of primarily 
positive symptoms, may alleviate some of this burden on subjective clinical judgment. 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that even standardized test 
protocolsremain tools only, to which clinical expertise and idiopathic contextual knowledge must 
be applied in interpretation.  Standardized measurescan only be used to suggestdissimulation or 
feigning, i.e., “the deliberate fabrication or gross exaggeration of psychological or physical 
symptoms without any assumptions about its goals” (Rogers, 2008c, p. 5, italics added; Rogers 
& Bender, 2003).  Psychological tests therefore can only indicate the likely presence of an 
exaggerated or fabricated response style, and cannot be used to conclusively establish 
malingering, or provide a differential diagnosis with regard to the possibility of factious 
disorders (i.e., feigning motivated by the desire to assume a “sick role”), conversion disorders, or 
other disorders that might typically present with symptom endorsement styles of an exaggerated 
nature such as borderline personality disorder(APA, 2000).  These diagnostic distinctions 
necessitate the application of clinical judgment regarding the likely motivation for a feigning 
response style(Otto, 2008).  As such, the procedures proposed herein refer to detection of a 
feigning response style, not “malingering” per se.  Furthermore, as noted above, even if 
malingering is clinically identified, malingering and mental illness are not mutually 
exclusive(Resnick & Knoll, 2008; Rogers, 2008c).  One advantage of examining the variables 
measuredin this study, as described in greater detail below, is that it combines measurement of 
response style patterns that are both predicted to be present in malingerers but not genuine 
schizophrenia patients with response style patterns that are predicted to be present in genuine 
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schizophrenia patients but not in malingerers, thus simultaneously providing a rich assessment 
ofevaluation presentation characteristics indicating both malingering and genuine presence of the 
disorder. 
Currently utilized assessment tools. Current standardized methods to assess 
malingering of psychosis generally examine content of self-report in relationship to positive 
symptoms of psychosis (i.e., hallucinations and delusions).  These measures seek to identify one 
of two broad categories of response styles thought to be indicative of malingering: unlikely 
presentations (including rare symptoms, quasi rare symptoms, improbable symptoms, symptom 
combinations, and spurious patterns of psychopathology); and amplified presentations in terms 
of frequency and intensity of symptoms and endorsement of symptoms that may appear plausible 
to malingerers based on general misconceptions about mental illness (including indiscriminant 
symptom endorsement, symptom severity, obvious symptoms, reported versus observed 
symptoms, and erroneous stereotypes) (see Rogers, 2008b, for an in-depth description of the 
strengths and limitations of each of these assessment strategies). 
Rogers (2008a)cites the unlikely presentation of rare symptoms, which focuses on 
a high endorsement rate among malingerers on self-report items that are endorsed by less than 
5% of individuals with actual disorders and yields large to very large effect sizes, as the “work 
horse” among currentmethods of assessment of feigned mental disorders(p. 392).  Examples of 
scales using this approachcontained in measures designed specifically to detect malingering of 
mental disorders include the Rare Symptoms scale of the Structured Interview of Reported 
Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992)and Unusual Hallucinations scale of the 
Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms (M-FAST; Miller, 2001).  (For an in-depth discussions 
of the more extensive SIRS, which utilizes several of the response style assessment methods 
 
 
9 
 
cited above, see Rogers, 2008e.For a review ofbrief screening measures such as the M-FAST, as 
well as theM Test (Beaber, Marston, Michelli, & Mills, 1985)and Structured Inventory of 
Malingered Symptomatology(Smith & Burger, 1997), seeSmith, 2008.)In addition, identification 
of unlikely presentation of rare symptoms is also the key detection method of theNegative 
Impression Management scale of the Personality Assessment Inventory (NIM scale of the PAI; 
Morey, 2007) and the F-psychiatric scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 
(MMPI-2;Hathaway, McKinley, & Butcher, 1990)(Rogers, 2008b). (For a more in-depth review 
of malingering assessment using the embedded scales of the MMPI-2 and PAI, see Greene, 
2008, andSellbom & Bagby, 2008, respectively.) The rare symptoms method is contrasted with 
the “quasi-rare symptoms” method, such as is utilized by the MMPI-2 F and F-back scales, 
which focuses on symptoms that are rare in normative populations, and may result in 
unacceptable levels of false positives due to the fact that individuals with genuine disorders may 
also endorse such symptoms. It may also be contrasted with the improbable symptom method, 
such as is utilized by the SIRS Improbable and Absurd Symptoms scale, which represents an 
extreme version of rare symptoms by focusing on fantastic or preposterous symptoms, but may 
lead to a high rate of false negatives among sophisticated malingerers due to the high face 
validity of these items(Rogers, 2008b). Projective measures, such as the Rorschach(Rorschach, 
1921), while once thought to be impervious to deliberate response distortion due to their lack of 
face validity, have been generally demonstrated to be wholly unsuccessful at identifying 
malingering (see Sewell, 2008, for a review). 
Self-report of improbable or grossly exaggerated positive symptomology may be 
most useful in detecting unsophisticated obvious attempts at malingering.  While “[m]alingerers 
with relatively poor understanding of the phenomenology of genuine psychosis may be readily 
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detected…malingerers who possess shrewdness and detailed knowledge of psychosis may 
deceive even seasoned forensic clinicians”(Resnick & Knoll, 2008, p. 51).  For example, the 
specificity and positive predictive power of the SIRS, which has been termed the “gold standard” 
in malingering detection (Rogers, 2008e), are reported as 99.5% and 99%, respectively; but 
sensitivity and negative predictive power are reported at only 48.5% and 64.9% (in a population 
with a malingering base rate of 51%), respectively (Green, Rosenfeld, Dole, Pivovarova, & Zapf, 
2008; Rogers, Bagby,& Dickens, 1992;see also Sellbom & Bagby, 2008, discussing the 
limitations of the PAI NIM scale in detecting sophisticated malingerers). 
Importantly, coaching about response style detection methods can affect the 
results of many of these tests (Chesterman, Terbeck, & Vaughan, 2008;Rogers, 2008a).For 
example, many studies have found that being provided with information about the validity scales 
of the MMPI-2 helps simulators avoid detection (Greene, 2008).Furthermore, increased 
dissemination of strategies to avoid detection via the Internet continues to increase the risk that 
coaching may adversely affect the sensitivity of these existing measures that rely solely on 
explicit symptom endorsement (an issue suggested for future research by Smith (2008)).  As 
illustration, a simple online search for “schizophrenia malingering” using Google’s search engine 
revealed publicly-accessible, easily-understandable detailed information about symptoms 
endorsed by individuals with genuine psychosis, and a test-by-test description of specific 
malingering detection strategies, including feigned symptomsthat distinguish malingerers, within 
the first three search results (e.g., Detecting Malingering,retrieved 8/17/11).   
Examining Behaviorally-Based Speech Characteristics Under Controlled Conditions of 
Variable Affective and Cognitive Load to Identify Feigning of Schizophrenia 
 
It has been noted by anecdotal clinical observation(Resnick, 1993; Resnick & 
Knoll, 2008)that the self-reported content of delusions and hallucinations are generally the focus 
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of malingerers’ self-report as they are easier to feign due to their obvious nature; but malingerers 
rarely attempt to feign other important symptoms of schizophrenia, such as formal thought 
disorder or more subtle negative symptoms such as flat affect and alogia.  Yet despite the 
emphasis placed on clinical recognition of the incongruence of reporting significant positive 
symptomsin the absence of these other signs of schizophrenia as a red flag for the identification 
of malingering (e.g., Resnick & Knoll, 2008), there is very little research examining the 
usefulness of capitalizing on this phenomenon in malingering detection in a more structured 
manner, and no indication that any standardized assessment of disorganization or negative 
symptoms has been incorporated into malingering assessment in clinical practice as part of 
anyroutinely utilized systemized procedures.   
This paper thus examinedthrough empirical means this persistent clinical 
observation that malingerers self-report assumed content of positive symptoms but rarely exhibit 
thought disorganization or negative symptoms, by analyzing speech characteristics indicative of 
thought disorganization, alogia, and flat affect under experimentally-manipulated conditions of 
affective reactivity andcognitive load. A particular strength of this approach to malingering 
assessment is that it makes use of two detection strategies—symptom combinations and spurious 
patterns of psychopathology—which have been proposed asespecially useful in combating the 
effects of coaching, as the complex patterns of symptoms found in genuine disorders may be too 
difficult for even sophisticated malingerers to effectively deliberately feign (Rogers, 2008a).  
Furthermore, increasing cognitive load may have a similar effect to the recommend lengthy 
interview (i.e., intended to capitalize on the fact that as malingerers become fatigued it is more 
difficult to consistently maintain feigned symptoms) (e.g., Resnick, 1993; Resnick & Knoll, 
2008); but within a much shorter time frame and in a more structured manner.  In addition, while 
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the behavioral pattern of speech performance under variable levels of cognitive load provides the 
key elements for this proposed method of malingering detection, research indicates that 
individuals feigning psychosis frequently also attempt to feign cognitive impairment (Resnick & 
Knoll, 2008).  Thus, the cognitive tests themselves may provide yet another dimension of 
malingering assessment, based on a detection strategy with elements of the performance curve 
(i.e., based on the finding that genuine patients produce predictable patterns of errors with 
increased item difficulty, while malingerers usually demonstrate much less of a distinction 
between easy and difficult items) and floor effect (i.e., based on the finding that some 
malingerers do not recognize that simple cognitive tasks could be completed by impaired 
individuals) methods of assessment of feigned cognitive impairment (see Rogers, 2008b, for an 
in-depth review of the strengths and limitations of detection strategies used to assess feigned 
cognitive impairment). 
Communication Disturbances Index 
Communication disturbances are a fundamental symptom ofdisorders marked by 
disordered thought processes, including schizophrenia and mania(Docherty, DeRosa, et al., 
1996).  Docherty’s(2005) research supports a model whereby communication failures are a 
behavioral manifestation of speech disorder that results from the overlapping but conceptually 
distinct constructs of thought disorder, disorganization, and neurocognitive impairments. 
This paper measured communication disturbance(CD) in terms of deficits in 
clarity of meaning of speech through use of the Communication Disturbances Index (CDI; 
Docherty, DeRosa, et al., 1996), a method of identifying subtle forms of referential failuresin 
natural language that has revealed consistent differences between schizophrenia patients and 
controls, particularly under conditions of emotional stress.  The CDI rates severity of 
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communication disturbance along six dimensions of referential failure (vague references, 
confused references, missing information, ambiguous word meanings, wrong word references, 
and structural unclarities), to arrive at a total communication disturbances score, as described in 
greater detail below (see Methods). It has been proposed that these types of referential failures 
may reflect: (1) lack of awareness or attention to the listener’s needs in understanding a 
communication—i.e., an assumption that the listener will understand the speaker’s thoughts 
without being told, (2) errors in distinguishing between previous communications and previous 
thoughts, or (3) confusion among referents; all of which may reflect disturbances in the patient’s 
understanding of boundaries between the speaker and listener, between the patient’s inner world 
and the outer world, or among people or objects(Docherty, 1995). 
In affectively-neutral conditions (i.e., interviews using open-ended questions 
about daily activities, routines, hobbies, leisure activities),use of the CDI has revealed 
significantly higher rates of CD among schizophrenia patients as compared to 
nonpsychiatriccontrols (Docherty, 2005; Docherty, et al., 2003), with effect sizes (Cohen’s 
d)ranging from .98 – 1.14.  It is noteworthy that this magnitude of difference is consistent with 
effect sizes suggested by Rogers (2008b) as key for obtaining systematic differentiation of 
response styles (moderate = Cohen’s d ≥ 0.75; large ≥ 1.25; very large ≥ 1.50).CDI scores have 
been shown to be correlated with formal thought disorder and conceptual disorganization ratings, 
in addition to cognitive deficits (Docherty, 2005).  CDI scores have demonstrated good temporal 
stability over two weeks and nine months, regardless of positive or negative symptom 
fluctuations(Docherty, et al., 2003).  It is notable that CD in the Docherty, et al. (2003) study 
showed greater stability than broader clinical formal thought disorder ratings.  In addition to the 
possibility that CDis more trait-like than formal thought disorder, these differences in stability 
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also raise the possibility that the standardized method of examining referential failures using the 
CDI may provide important psychometric improvements over subjective clinician ratings, which 
may be subject to issues such as halo effects. 
Communication disturbances under conditions of variable affective load. 
“Affective reactivity” refers to the phenomenon that speech disturbances have been shown to 
increase among schizophrenia patients under conditions of emotional stress (i.e., when 
discussing affectively negative topics) (e.g., Docherty, Rhinewine, Nienow, & Cohen, 2001). 
Importantly, use of the affective reactivity paradigm in examining CD has revealed specific 
patterns of CD exacerbation under affective strain that are unique to schizophrenia.  While the 
temporal stability of CD in schizophrenia (Docherty, et al., 2003) and similarities between 
schizophrenia patients and first-degree relatives (Docherty, 1995) under affectively neutral 
conditions may “support the idea that referential disturbances reflect stable, trait-like cognitive 
characteristics of patients, characteristics that may actually be related to vulnerability more than 
to overt illness” (Docherty, et al., 2003, p.474), schizophrenia patients show more affective 
reactivity (i.e., increased CD under unpleasant emotion conditions) than their parents or 
controls(Docherty, Hall, & Gordinier, 1998).  These results have been interpreted to suggest that 
“reactivity of referential communication disturbances may reflect normal processes that are 
exaggerated in schizophrenia” (p. 465). Interestingly, while controls in the Docherty et al. (1998) 
study did demonstrate some increase in CD in the affectively unpleasant condition, parents did 
not demonstrate any significant differences in going from the pleasant to unpleasant condition, 
which the authors note may reflect a protective factor among non-psychiatric individuals with 
possible genetic vulnerability to schizophrenia spectrum disorders.  Similarly, while depressed 
patients demonstrated higher levels of CD than controls using the CDI, schizophrenia patients 
 
 
15 
 
still demonstrated more frequent total referential failures than depressed patients; and only 
schizophrenia patients, but not depressed patients,demonstrated increased CD due to affective 
reactivity(Rubino et al., 2011).  Relatedly, while baseline rates of CD are not associated with 
positive symptom severity, magnitude of increase in CD under conditions of affective reactivity 
are (Docherty & Hebert, 1997). 
With regard to its potential utility as a tool to assist in the detection of 
malingering, examination of referential failures using the CDI maybe a more sensitive measure 
than other communication disturbance measures that focus on broad manifestations of thought 
disorder, such as topic changes and circumstantiality(e.g., the Scale for Assessment of Thought, 
Language, and Communication (Andreasen, 1986)).  (See Docherty, 2005, for a more in-depth 
comparison of communication disturbances as examined through referential failures with 
measures of thought disorder and disorganization that focus on speech behavior more likely to 
reflect loose associations, such as topic derailment; see also Kerns, 2007.)  Broad disorganization 
symptomssuch as blatant tangentiality may be more likely to be seen in malingerers attempting 
to “[t]alk stupid, dumb, and crazy…[and not] complete sentences…” (quoted from a letter from 
an identified malingerer to his incarcerated girlfriend, instructing her to “[s]tart talking about 
any- and everything.  Keep changing subjects,” (Resnick & Knoll, 2008, p. 65)).  By contrast, 
malingerers may be less likely to understand how to feign more subtle referential failures.  Thus, 
whenResnick and Knoll (2008) have cautioned clinicians to be alert to the possibility of 
malingering in the absence of signs of formal thought disorder, these more subtle signs of 
communication disturbance may have also contributed to their clinical impressions.  The CDI 
provides a useful means to quantify such clinical impressionsof subtle behavioral signs to allow 
for rigorous empirical comparison between groups.  
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Communication disturbances under conditions of variable cognitive 
load.Another standardized conditional manipulation that could reveal important differences 
between malingerers and genuine schizophrenia patients is cognitive load manipulation.  First, 
with regard to the cognitive tasks themselves, Kertzman et al.(2006) compared performance of 
genuine schizophrenia patients and suspected malingers on two tasks of variable cognitive 
load—the first was a simple visual reaction time task that required participants to press a red key 
every time a red square was displayed on a screen, and the second was a visual choice reaction 
time task required participations to press a red key if a red square was displayed and a black key 
if a black square was displayed.  Not only did the malingering group perform significantly worse 
than the schizophrenia group across the dependent variables (reaction time, variability in reaction 
time, and accuracy) in both conditions; but, more importantly, the malingering group 
demonstrated the opposite pattern from the schizophrenia group when comparing the lower to 
higher cognitive load.  While the schizophrenia group’s performance was worse on the second, 
more difficult task, the malingerers’ performance was worse on the first, easier task. These 
results are consistent with research indicating that individuals feigning psychosis frequently also 
attempt to feign cognitive impairment (Resnick & Knoll, 2008).  Furthermore, this design takes 
advantage of more sophisticated methodology by comparing malingerers and genuine patients 
not just on severity of cognitive deficits, but also on patterns of cognitive performance on tasks 
of varying difficulty.  Only t-tests were performed in this study comparing the two groups, and 
thus significance of the directional within-group between tasks differences and the group by task 
condition interaction are unknown; but the direction of the low-to-high load condition cognitive 
performance patterns suggests an interesting element of information that could be added to a 
malingering assessment procedure.  The presentstudy expanded on this paradigm by 
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simultaneously assessing patterns of cognitive performance and verbal behavior under variable 
loads of working memory demand. 
Pursuant to “cognitive load theory,” subtle forms of communication disturbances 
characteristic of schizophrenia should be exacerbated under conditions of high cognitive 
load.Cognitive load theory originated as a framework for maximizing the efficiency of the 
learning process by facilitating changes in long term memory through minimization of 
extraneous working memory load (see Paas, Van Gog, & Sweller, 2010; and Sweller, 2010, for 
reviews).  The theory is based, in part, on recognition of the well-established fact that working 
memory, the site of conscious information processing, is very limited in capacitywhen 
processing novel information(Baddeley, 1986; Miller, 1956). Thus, reducing working memory 
load provides for more efficient cognitive processing.  Over the past decade, a handful of 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorder researchers have begun to use this concept of manipulation of 
working memory load to achieve the opposite goal—i.e., straining cognitive processing 
capacity—in order to experimentally exacerbate and thus gain greater understanding of language 
and prosody dysfunction in the disorder (e.g., Melinder & Barch, 2003).  While increased 
working memory load has been shown, to some extent, to decrease amount, rate, inflection, and 
intensity of speech in even healthy controls (Cohen, Morrison, Brown, & Minor, 2011), 
examination of speech dysfunction in schizophrenia under variable conditions of working 
memory load has revealed specific patterns in magnitude of exacerbation of diminished 
expressivity (Cohen, McGovern, Dinzeo, & Covington, manuscript in preparation; Melinder & 
Barch, 2003).  Additionally, although patterns of referential failures have generally been studied 
more extensively in the context of affective reactivity, research on the specific relationship 
between working memory and communication disturbances in schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
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supports the proposition that examination of communication disturbance patterns under variable 
levels of cognitive load may also provide rich information in distinguishing genuine 
schizophrenia patients from feigners.   
Melinder and Barch(2003) found thatwhat they termed “negative thought 
disorder” (i.e., verbal productivity, syntactic complexity, poverty of speech, pausing, and 
blocking) increased among schizophrenia patients in a condition of high cognitive load 
(answering neutral open-ended questions while completing a forced-choice continuous 
performance task whereby participants pressed one key in response to a target word stimulus and 
another in response to other stimuli), as compared to a condition of low cognitive load(answering 
neutral open-ended questions, such as “describe a typical day for you”), butclinically-rated 
formal thought disorder (discourse coherence and fluency deficits) did not.  In addition, they 
found that negative thought disorder and formal thought disorder were inversely relatedin the 
high load condition.  The authors reasoned that this supports the theory that both types of speech 
disturbance reflect different manifestations of coping with basic working memory deficitsunder 
cognitively taxing situations.  Relatedly, discourse coherence in this study (but not fluency) was 
correlated with performance during a non-speaking trial on the category monitoring task, which 
relies on maintenance of a target stimulus in memory, and negative thought disorder was 
correlated with performance on a speaking span task requiring generation of a sentence for 
provided word stimuli, which places demands on the ability to generate a message plan.  This is 
consistent with previous research noted by the authors indicating that language production 
requires the simultaneous performance of several tasks, including generating a message plan, 
maintaining the message plan and prior discourse facts, and monitoring ongoing speech for 
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errors (Levelt, 1989), some or all of which may require working memory performance 
(Daneman, 1991). 
One limitation to the Melinder and Barch (2003) study that was addressed by the 
present study relates to how CD was measured.  Formal thought disorderin the Melinder and 
Barch(2003) study was rated according to the Scale for the Assessment of Thought, Language, 
and Communication (Andreasen, 1986), which asks clinicians to rate the frequency of 
disturbances in discourse coherence (nonsequiturs, tangential responses, derailments, loss of a 
goal, distractibility, and pronominal reference errors), disturbances in fluency (neologisms, word 
approximations, incoherence), disturbances in content (perseverations and illogicality), and 
disturbances in social convention (poverty of content, circumstantiality).As noted, the CDI, by 
contrast, measures more subtle referential failures. Thus, difference in these more subtle 
referential failures could potentially be revealed by CDI scores across cognitive load conditions. 
In addition, the Melinder and Barch(2003) study compared performance on a free speech task to 
speech performance during a cognitive task with a single level of difficulty.  By contrast, the 
“cognitive load” task used in this study compared speech performance during a free speech 
condition to speech performance during two separate cognitive tasks of varying working memory 
demand (one similar to that used in the Melinder and Barch(2003) study, and a second 1-back 
task that poses even higher working memory demands; see Methods), which could potentially 
reveal more intricate group difference in patterns of CD across cognitive load conditions.  It also 
must be recalled that a key issue in this study was comparison of patterns of speech disturbance 
under varying levels of working memory load between genuine patients and feigners, whereas 
the Melinder and Barch(2003) study examined only within-group differences across cognitive 
load conditions among schizophrenia patients.   
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Research examining the cognitive correlates of CD using the CDI indicates that 
CD is strongly related to working memory deficits, and may thus be vulnerable to exacerbation 
under manipulation of working memory load.  The CDI has been shown to be related to more 
basic cognitive deficits in schizophrenia, including sustained attention on two visual continuous 
performance tasks on which participants were instructed to press a button every time a target 
digit appeared (one with difficulty level increased by visual degradation of the stimuli), two trail-
making sequencing tasks of variable working memory load(one requiring participants to link 
numbers sequentially, e.g., 1…2…3…, the second requiring participant to alternately link 
numbers and letters sequentially), and the conceptual sequencing subtest of the Shipley Institute 
of Living Scale(Shipley, 1940), which requires participants to complete sequences of numbers or 
letters based on different implicit conceptual organization methods(Docherty, 2005; see also 
Kerns, 2007; andKerns & Berenbaum, 2003, finding a link between working memory/n-back 
task performance deficits and CD in schizophrenia).  Interestingly, neither clinically-rated formal 
thought disorder, as measured using the Global Thought Disorder subscale from the Scale for 
Assessment of Positive Symptoms(Andreasen, 1983), which measures broad manifestations of 
thought disorder such as derailment, pressure of speech, tangentiality, circumstantiality, 
illogicality, distractibility, clang associations, and incoherence, nor clinically-rated conceptual 
disorganization, measured using Conceptual Disorganization subscale of the Brief Psychiatric 
Rating Scale(Overall & Gorham, 1962), which asks clinicians to rate the extent to which speech 
is structurally disorganized, were correlated with these basic working memory measures. Only 
the two trail-making sequencing tests were correlated with CDI scores among controls—the two 
sustained visual attention tasks, which are much more similar to the cognitive tasks that were 
utilized in this study, were not.Similarly, in a prior study, Docherty et al.(1996) found that 
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among schizophrenia patients referential failures were associated with working memory deficits 
but not concept formation and verbal fluency; whereas among individuals with bipolar disorder 
or non-psychiatric controls, referential failures were associated with concept formation and 
verbal fluency, but not working memory deficits. Furthermore, Docherty(2005) found that 
simple working memory deficits remained significantly related to CDI scores even after ratings 
of global level of functioning and global severity of illness were controlled for using hierarchical 
regression analysis.  (After entering low-load attention measures into the hierarchical model, 
high-load versions of the same task did not explain significant amounts of additional variability 
in the Docherty (2005) study, but this is likely due to the large amount of shared variance 
attributed to the low-load condition.) 
Interestingly, research among schizotypal participants, i.e., individuals who are 
theorized to be at-risk for development of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, suggests that the 
increase in CD found when discussing unpleasant memories using the affective reactivity 
paradigm (see above) may actually reflect underlying attention deficits.  Kerns and Becker 
(2008) found that working memory deficits were associated with affective reactivity of CD in 
individuals with elevated disorganized schizotypy symptoms, and that after controlling for 
working memory deficits schizotypy and control group differences in CD were no longer 
significant. Therefore, manipulating working memory load by having participants provide free 
speech samples while simultaneously completing cognitive tasks that deplete working memory 
resources may provide a more direct means of exacerbating schizophrenia-spectrum related CD 
than the affective reactivity paradigm, which requires participants to subjectively appraise the 
unpleasant emotional condition as “stressful” in order for group differences in CD to be revealed 
(Docherty & Grillon, 1995).  
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Flat affect and alogia as measured using the CANS procedure 
Examination of negative speech-related schizophrenia symptoms may provide yet 
another dimension of richness to assessment of malingering in schizophrenia. Such symptoms 
include alogia (e.g., poverty of speech) and flat affect (e.g., lack of prosodic expressivity in 
speech). While these symptoms have traditionally been measured using Likert-type clinician 
rating scales such as the Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (Andreasen, 1984), 
over the past decade refinements have been made in utilizing more sophisticated computerized 
analysis protocols to more precisely measure verbal expressivity through examination of acoustic 
properties of speech, including alogia (operationalized by measuring periods of speech 
production versus pauses), and flat or blunted affect (operationalized by examining variability of 
volume and frequency) (Computerized Assessment of Natural Speech, or “CANS”; e.g., Cohen, 
et al., 2009, 2010).Generally, these variables have demonstrated moderate to good temporal 
stability over a week’s period (Cohen, et al., 2013). 
Utilization of computerized acoustic analysis to examine verbal expressivity 
provides significant improvement over use of clinical ratings, which are more vulnerable to 
imprecision due to global impression (Alpert, Shaw, Pouget, & Lim, 2002). Furthermore, 
computerized acoustic analysis of verbal expressivity may provide psychometric benefits for 
precision in use of parametric statistics, as it can produce normally-distributed ratio-level data, as 
compared to clinical ratings that often form skewed data distributions, are ordinal in nature, and 
are generally restricted in range (Cohen, Alpert, Nienow, Dinzeo, & Docherty, 2008).   
Flat affect and alogia under conditions of variable affective load.In contrast to 
CD, a literature review revealed no existing published studies examining changes of in-the-
moment vocal prosody or clinically-rated verbal expressivity in schizophrenia under 
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experimentally-manipulated conditions of affective load.  However, among healthy adults, high-
arousal affectively-valenced autobiographical tasks have been associated with such prosody 
changes of small effect sizes (Cohen, et al., 2010). Furthermore, given the relationships in 
schizophrenia between working memory load and diminished verbal expressivity (Kerns, 2007), 
and between working memory deficits and affective reactivity of CD (Docherty, 2005; Docherty, 
Hawkins, et al., 1996; Kerns, 2007; Kerns & Berenbaum, 2003), it is logical that diminished 
expressivity may be subject to similar principles of affective reactivity. 
Flat affect and alogia under conditions of variable cognitive load.As discussed 
above, Melinder and Barch(2003) found that clinician ratings of negative speech characteristics 
are exacerbated under conditions of higher cognitive load.  Similarly, clinically-rated blunt affect 
and alogia are associated with exaggerated reduction in computer-analyzed expressivity in 
conditions of increased cognitive load among individuals with both schizophrenia and depression 
(Cohen, et al., 2013, manuscript in preparation).  Furthermore, working memory deficits are 
associated with negative speech symptoms (see Kerns, 2007—working memory and controlled 
retrieval interacted to predict poverty of speech). 
Study Design 
Studies of feigning assessment measures generally utilize one of two main 
designs—the simulation design and known-groups comparisons (see generally Rogers, 2008c).  
Most research employs the simulation paradigm, an analog design by which community (or more 
often, undergraduate) participants are randomly assigned to an honest or feigning (i.e., instructed 
to attempt to present oneself “as if” a certain disorder were present) condition.  The 
performances of these groups are then compared to the performance of a genuine clinical 
sample(i.e., individuals believed to actually have the disorder at issue). The simulation design 
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provides strong internal validity due to its standardized method and partially experimental 
design, but weak external validity due to the low personal stakes of the artificial situation and 
resulting lack of motivation to successfully feign a disorderthat might be present in a true 
malingering context. 
By contrast, a known-groups paradigm compares a genuine clinical sample and 
actual suspected malingerers, as identified by independent experts.  As such, its validity rests on 
accurate a priori identification of malingering and clinical groups, and blindness of the 
researchers administering the target assessment test to participants’ group membership.  
Assuming accurate classification of participants, although internal validity is weak due to the 
lack of experimental control, the known-groups comparison design provides strong external 
validity.  Somewhat similar to the known-groups comparison is a bootstrapping comparison; but 
in the bootstrapping comparison design participants are placed in high-probability groups of 
feigners and genuine patients using stringent cut scores on previously-established measures of 
feigning instead of independent expert identification.  However, malingering assessment 
methods supported by such designs run the risk of being clinically useful only in cases of 
extreme, unsophisticated malingering presentations. Alternatively, some researchers have 
utilized a differential prevalence design in an attempt to approximate the known groups design.  
This design compares performance on measures by individuals in different assessment or referral 
contexts (i.e., litigation v. non-litigation), based on the assumption that base rates of malingering 
will be higher in one group than the other, and therefore differences between the groups reflect 
differences in malingerers and non-malingerers.  As noted by Rogers(2008c), “[s]uch simplistic 
thinking should not be tolerated in clinical research [and should not purport to identify utility 
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estimates of a measure], although it may play a marginal role in advancing theory” (p. 11-12; see 
also Rogers, 2008d). 
The present study employed a simulation design, which is consistent with Rogers’ 
(2008d) recommendation that “[t]he logicalsequence of development of an assessment 
method[is] with simulation studies [which provide the advantages of comparative ease in 
obtaining participants and the ability to refine measures under systematic conditions] followed 
by known-groups comparisons…[which] are best used to cross-validate results of simulation 
studies”(p. 427). 
Hypotheses 
This study compared the speech characteristics of “honest” healthy controls (i.e., 
individuals instructed to complete the speech and cognitive performance tasks without special 
instruction), “feigners” (i.e., healthy controls instructed to complete the speech and cognitive 
performance tasks as if to convince an evaluator that they have schizophrenia), and a genuine 
schizophrenia group, under conditions of variable affective and cognitive load.  It was expected 
that feigners would attempt to exaggerate cognitive deficits by intentionally performing poorly 
on the cognitive performance tasks, but would not be able to successfully feign the more subtle 
referential failures and expressivity deficits found in the schizophrenia group on either speech 
task. In both tasks, overall group differences and group differences in patterns of behavior when 
comparing conditions of low to high affective and cognitive load were examined.  Specifically, it 
was hypothesized that: 
I. When participants wereasked to speak about affectively-valenced topics, there 
would be: 
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a. significant main effectsfor participant group, such that the schizophrenia 
group would demonstrate significantly more overall referential failures on the 
CDI and expressivity deficits on the CANS than both the honest control 
group(Docherty, et al., 1998)and feigners (based on Resnick and 
Knoll’s(2008)clinical observations), who would not differ from one another; 
and 
b. significant interactions between group and affective condition variables, such 
that the magnitude of increase in referential failures on the CDI and 
expressivity deficits on the CANSfor the schizophrenia group in comparing 
the pleasant condition to the unpleasant condition and/or the low-arousal to 
high-arousal conditionwould be significantly largerthan for controls 
(Docherty, et al., 1998)orfeigners(Resnick & Knoll, 2008).  
II. Similarly, when participants were asked to provide neutral speech samples while 
either performing no cognitive task or simultaneously performing cognitive tasks 
of variable working memory demand, there would be: 
a. significant main effects for participant group, such that the schizophrenia 
group would demonstrate significantly more overall referential failures, 
alogia, and vocal prosody deficits than the honest control group(Docherty, 
2005; Melinder & Barch, 2003) and feigners (Resnick & Knoll, 2008), who 
would not differ from one another; and 
b. significant interactions between group and condition, such that the magnitude 
of increase in referential failuresfor the schizophrenia group as working 
memory load increased by task would be significantly larger than for controls 
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(Docherty, 2005) or feigners (Resnick & Knoll, 2008), as would the 
magnitude of increase in alogia and prosody deficits (Cohen, et al., manuscript 
in preparation; Melinder & Barch, 2003; Resnick & Knoll, 2008). 
III. In addition, when participants were asked to complete cognitive performance 
tasks of variable working memory demand, there would be: 
a. a significant group effect, such that the feigners would demonstrate poorer 
overall cognitive performance compared to the schizophrenia group 
(Kertzman, et al., 2006), who would in turn demonstrate poorer overall 
cognitive performance compared to the honest control group (Melinder & 
Barch, 2003); and 
b. a significant interaction, such that the schizophrenia and honest control groups 
would perform worse during conditions of higherworking memory load than a 
lower working memory load condition; but feigners would perform worse 
during thelower load condition than a higherworking memory load condition 
(Kertzman, et al., 2006). 
Thus, consistent with most current methods of malingering detection (Rogers, 
2008b),cognitive performance outcome variables were expected to aid in identification of 
feigners because the feigners’ deliberate attempts to appear mentally ill would reveal patterns 
that distinguish them from both genuine schizophrenia patients and controls, as they were 
expected to behave in ways that were irrelevant to or excessive in severity when compared to 
individuals with schizophrenia. By contrast, it was expected that vocal pattern differences under 
conditions of variable affective and cognitive load would differentiate feigners from individuals 
with schizophrenia because feigners would not be able to deliberately exhibitsubtle verbal 
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behavior that is persistent in and specific to schizophrenia, and thus feigners would not perform 
significantly differently than honest controls.  In this manner, vocal pattern differences would be 
similar to EEG potentials examined byZarkowski, Esparza, and Russo (2007), who found 
thatmalingerers failed to show EEG potentials that are present in genuine schizophrenia patients, 
and thus looked more like controls (see also Anderson, Trethowan, and Kenna’s(1959) study of 
feigning of pseudo-dementia, in which patients demonstrated perseveration but feigners did not, 
and thus the authors suggested that this pattern of perseveration could be used to rule out 
malingering).This approach—i.e., including measurement of behavioral markers specific to 
schizophrenia which may support the presence of a genuine disorder—mayprovide the added 
benefit of lowering the risk of false-positive errors among individuals with schizophrenia who 
exaggerate their positive symptoms in an unsophisticated manner (the most likely to be detected, 
e.g., on the SIRS)—as individuals may do when they actually are in need of treatment, but 
resources are scarce (e.g., in prison;Resnick & Knoll, 2008).  For example, by examining EEG 
potentials specific to schizophrenia patients,Zarkowski, et al. (2007) identified one likely 
genuine patient who, upon detailed re-examination of the participant selection process, appeared 
to have been placed in the “malingering” group based on false positive resultson the SIRS.  
Furthermore, combining these two strategies for detection of feigning of schizophrenia may 
reveal patterns that bolster the accuracy of detection of feigning by even sophisticated 
malingerers(Rogers, 2008a). 
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METHODS 
Participants 
Participants in the present study comprised the following groups: individuals with 
schizophrenia,control participants recruited from the community surrounding Louisiana State 
University (i.e., “honest responders”), and a feigning group composed of individuals also 
recruited from the community but provided with additional information about schizophrenia 
symptoms and instructed to complete the speech tasks “as if” they were attempting to convince 
the examiner that they have schizophrenia.  All diagnostic determinations were made by trained 
graduate-level psychology students according to DSM-IV criteria (APA, 2000), and confirmed 
by consensus meeting with Alex Cohen, Ph.D. Exclusionary criteria included: a) Global 
Assessment of Functioning rating below 30, indicating symptom levels that could interfere with 
participation in the study, b) documented evidence of mental retardation from the medical 
records, c) current or historical DSM-IV diagnosis of alcohol or drug abuse suggestive of severe 
physiological symptoms (e.g., delirium tremens, repeated loss of consciousness), and d) history 
of significant head trauma (requiring overnight hospitalization).The study was approved by the 
appropriate Human Subject Review Boards and all participants provided informed consent prior 
to participating in the study.  
Schizophrenia group 
Schizophrenia patients were recruited from outpatient community mental health 
clinics and residential facilities in the Baton Rouge and Lafayette, LA, areas as part of a larger 
study. Diagnoses werebased on information obtained from the patients’ medical records and a 
structured clinical interview adopted from the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders 
(SCID; First, 1996). At the time of testing, all patients were clinically stable and currently in 
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treatment under the supervision of a multi-disciplinary team. Patients received $40 for 
participation in the larger studyprotocol, which took approximately four hours for each 
participant to complete and included administration of the measures described herein, as well as 
several other measures administered for additional research purposes. Data from the 
schizophrenia group was collected over the time period of December 2010 through July 2012. 
Honest control group 
Community control participantswere recruited from the Baton Rouge area as part 
of a larger study, with the goal of obtaining a control sample as closely matched as possible to 
the schizophrenia group on demographic characteristics such as age, ethnicity, education, and 
socioeconomic status. In addition to the exclusionary criteria set forth above, control participants 
wereinterviewed using the relevant modules of the SCID(First, 1996) to rule out the presence of 
any severe mental illnesses (i.e., psychosis, major depressive disorder, or bipolar 
disorder).Participants in the honest control group received $40 for participation in the larger 
study protocol, which took approximately four hours for each participant to complete and 
included administration of the measures described herein, as well as several other measures 
administered for additional research purposes. Data from the honest control group was collected 
over the time period of April 2010 through July 2012. 
Feigning group 
Like community control participants, participants in the feigning group were 
recruited from the Baton Rouge area. Participants were not excluded if they were current 
students of Louisiana State University, although participants were not recruited through the 
university’s psychology experiment pool.Participants in the feigning group were interviewed 
using the relevant modules of the SCID (First, 1996) to rule out the presence of any severe 
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mental illnesses (i.e., psychosis, major depressive disorder, or bipolar disorder).  To maintain 
parity with the schizophrenia and honest control group participants, who received approximately 
$10 per hour for participation in the larger data collection process (which required approximately 
four hours to complete), participants in the feigning group received $20 for their participation in 
this supplemental component of the study, which requiredapproximately one and a half to two 
hours to complete, as it comprised only a subset of the data collection procedures from the larger 
study protocol, which included several additional measures administered for other research 
purposes. Data from the feigning group was collected over the time period of November 2011 
through May 2012. 
In addition to the below-described speech task instructions that were given to all 
participants, prior to administration of the speech tasks individuals in the feigning group 
werealso provided information about schizophrenia symptoms, couched in non-technical terms 
(see Appendix A; as excerpted from National Institute of Mental Health, 2009, p. 3-5), which 
they were given 10 minutes to review prior to administration of the speech tasks.Additionally, 
individuals in this group were provided with the following directions, based on malingering 
research methodology suggestions by Rogers(2008d): 
“Malingering”refers to the purposeful attempt by individuals to fake a 
psychological disorder in order to gain some reward, such as social 
security benefits, or avoid something unpleasant, such as criminal 
prosecution or incarceration. As such, malingerers pose a significant 
unfair burden to society by increasing insurance premiums and utilizing 
public funds provided by lawful taxpayers intended to assist the truly 
mentally ill, and may even wrongfully evade criminal responsibility for 
serious offenses. In light of this burden posed to society by malingering, 
special techniques have been developed to distinguish between individuals 
who are truly mentally ill and those who are attempting to fake a disorder.  
In order to test some potential methods of detecting malingering, we 
would like you to complete the following tasks as if you were trying to 
convince an examiner that you have schizophrenia, based on the 
information about schizophrenia that we have provided to you, as well as 
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anyother knowledge you might have about schizophrenia from whatever 
source. Please imagine that the consequences of being identified as faking 
are very serious (such as receiving a criminal sentence of life in prison or 
the death penalty), and try your best to perform in a manner on the 
upcoming tasks that would convince an examiner that you truly have 
schizophrenia. In doing so, please keep in mind that the test was 
developed specifically to indicate whether someone is faking, so your 
performance must be believable enough to avoid detection. 
 
Speech Tasks 
For each speech task, participants were seated in front of a computer monitor 
while wearing a head-mounted microphone, on which they were instructed to focus their 
attention, with the research assistant out of view. The experiment was run using Eprime software 
version 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, 2002).For all groups, the cognitive load speech task 
was presented prior to the affective reactivity speech task, which allowed for examination of 
group differences in speech characteristics when responding to the open-ended, affectively-
neutral speech instructions of the cognitive load speech task without prior suggestion or priming 
of emotional tone by the subsequently-administered affective reactivity task. 
Cognitive load speech task 
As adapted from the procedure as set forth in Cohen, et al. (2011) for obtaining 
speech samples under variable conditions of cognitive load for analysis using the CANS, 
participants were instructed to provide speech samples of neutral topics (hobbies, living 
arrangements, food) while completing either a “medium load” cognitive task, a “high load” 
cognitive task, or no cognitive task (i.e., the “low load” baseline condition). The 
baselinecondition lasted 90 seconds. Each voiced cognitive task condition contained 30 stimulus 
items, taking 90 seconds or more to complete, with the first 90 seconds of speech recorded for 
analysis of speech variables. Stimulus items comprised six simple visual symbols from a 
common computer keyboard (e.g., “@,” “%,” “$”), which were presented consecutively and 
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randomly on the computer screen at interstimulus intervals of 2000 milliseconds. Speech 
instructions for the voiced conditions were open-ended and broad, which is also consistent with 
prior non-affective reactivity-based CDI research (e.g., Docherty, 2005;Docherty, et al., 2003).  
Neutral speech topic instructions are included in Appendix B.   
Based on Baddeley’s (1992) model of attention, visual stimuli chosen for the 
cognitive tasks should divide cognitive resources without directly affecting verbal expression 
(except through depleting working memory stores more generally)(Cohen, et al., 2011). 
Response instructions differed between the low- and high-load tasks, as indicated below.If no 
response choice was made within 2000 milliseconds, an incorrect response was recorded and the 
next stimulus item is presented.Prior to the voiced performance trial of each cognitive task, 
participants completed4practice trials of each cognitive task.  Practice trials consisted of 13 
stimulus items each, with the exception of the first of such trials, which provideddetailed 
instruction and corrective feedback on 4 stimulus item presentations.  Generalized corrective 
feedback (i.e., “correct,” “incorrect,” or “too slow”) was provided on all other trials, including 
voiced trials.   
Medium-load cognitive task. The medium-load condition consisted of a dual-
choice continuous performance task, similar to the task used by Melinder and Barch(2003), in 
that participants were required to continually monitor presented stimuli in order to respond to 
items based on whether they matched or did not match a predetermined target held in memory.  
Participants were instructed to press the “a” button on the computer keyboard if the presented 
stimulus object was an “*,” and to press the “l” key in response to any other presented stimulus. 
High-load cognitive task. The high-load condition consisted of a one-back test, 
based on a commonlyused test of attention and working memory(Cohen, et al., 2011). 
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Participants were instructed to press the “a” button on the computer keyboard if the presented 
stimulus was the same as the object presented just prior to that object.Approximately 25% of the 
symbols presented constituted targets pursuant to this criterion. Participants were instructed to 
press the “l” key if the presented stimulus was different from the object presented just prior.   
Affective reactivity speech task 
For the affective reactivity speech task, participants were instructed to recount 
memories falling into the following four broad topic domains, as characterized by affective tone 
and arousal level:  pleasant high-arousal, pleasant low-arousal, unpleasant high-arousal, and 
unpleasant low-arousal.  General and condition-specific instructions are set forth in Appendix 
C.Ninety-second speech samples wereobtained for each topic domain.  Order of condition 
presentation was randomized. 
This format of obtaining affectively-valenced open-ended autobiographical 
speech samples has been shown to reveal more meaningful prosody changes among healthy 
adults in moving across affective conditions than standardized visual photographic stimuli 
(Cohen, et al., 2010).  Furthermore, malingerers have been noted often to call attention to 
positive symptoms and “overact their part” (Resnick, 1993; Resnick & Knoll, 2008).  Allowing 
such presentation style to manifest in a free speech context may thus increase the magnitude of 
difference between groups on speech performance. 
Post-test Assessment 
Following administration of the speech tasks, participants in the feigning group 
were asked to complete a brief questionnaire about their approach to the speech tasks. For 
example, the questionnaire instructed participants to indicate their existing familiarity with 
mental illness, the particular symptoms they attempted to feign during the tasks, and to rate on a 
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Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 5 (extremely confident) how confident they 
were that they had performed the speech tasks in a manner that would successfully convince an 
evaluator that they did, in fact, have schizophrenia, as suggested by Rogers(2008d). A copy of 
the questionnaire is included herein as Appendix D. 
Dependent Variables 
Speech variables 
CDI. Speech provided in the affective and cognitive load speech tasks were 
transcribed and rated according to the CDI protocol set forth in greater detail by Docherty, 
Hawkins, et al. (1996).  The referential errors measured by the CDI fall into the following 6 
categories: 
1. Vague references—i.e., words or phrases that are unclear because they are 
overinclusive, and their lack of specificity significantly diminishes the meaning of the 
communication (e.g., “It seems so, you know, this, that, or the other.”). 
2. Confused references—i.e., references, often pronouns, that are unclear because they 
could refer to one of at least two alternative referents (e.g., “He stabbed the dude and 
I kicked him.  I thought he punched him. I thought he was on the ground just acting 
like he was hurt.”). 
3. Missing information references—i.e., references that assume the listener has prior 
information that he or she does not (e.g., “I like to work all right.  Some of those 
shops were filthy.  I liked the bakeries, some of the shops are clean,” (with no prior 
mention of any shops or bakeries)). 
4. Ambiguous word meanings—i.e., words or phrases used in such a way that its 
intended meaning is unclear, not because the wrong word has been chosen, but 
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because the word used could have a number of meanings in the current context and 
the correct meaning is not obvious (e.g., “He was a man that was pow in a minute.”). 
5. Wrong word references—i.e., a seemingly incorrect choice of word or phrase (e.g., 
“We’ve had our qualms about me bowling, but I’ve always won out,” (Does she mean 
“quarrels”?)). 
6. Structural unclarities—i.e., instances in which meaning is unclear due to a breakdown 
or inadequacy of grammatical structure (e.g., “We went to Arizona.  We stopped off 
lots of towns between Chicago,” (spoken by a person living in Connecticut)).   
Total CDI scores were calculated by summing the total number of communication 
failures per 100 words (to control for differences in the amount of speech generated). CDI ratings 
were made by the author after training to achieve adequate inter-rater reliability (ICC = .75) 
using consensus-rated samples from an archival data set maintained in the research lab of Alex 
Cohen, Ph.D., Louisiana State University. The author was blind to participant group. The author 
was also blind to speech task category, although content of samples from the affective reactivity 
task frequently suggested the relevant category. In a single case, a participant who simply 
verbalized the name of the key pressed he made during the medium cognitive load 
condition,instead of speaking about the topic provided in the task instructions, was excluded 
from the CDI analyses so as not to falsely depress the relevant group’s mean CDI scores, as the 
CDI score would have otherwise misleadingly been scored as “0” (i.e., indicating no instances of 
referential speech error). It was considered that speech behavior of this nature would be more 
appropriately captured by the acoustic alogia variables set forth below. 
CANS.The Computerized assessment of Affect from Natural Speech protocol was 
used to assess the behavioral manifestation of negative symptoms via the measurement of 
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Alogiavariables, which reflect reduction in the quantity of speech; Blunt Affectvariables, which 
reflect diminished expression of emotion characterized by reduced vocal inflection and 
amplitude variability; and Formant variables, which reflect diminished vocal expression 
associated with blunted facial expressivity (Cohen, et al., 2008, 2010, 2013, manuscript in 
preparation, see also Covington et al., 2012). 
For the present analyses, speech provided in the affective and cognitive load 
speech tasks was processed for analysis as follows (Cohen, et al., manuscript in preparation). 
Speech samples were digitally recorded at 16 bits per second at a sampling frequency of 44,100 
hertz. The digitized recordings were then analyzed using PRAAT (Boersma, 2006), a program 
used extensively in speech pathology and linguistic studies. The PRAAT system was used to 
organize sound files into “frames” for analysis, which were set at a rate of 100 per second. 
MATLAB and Excel Macro functions were employed to compute the variables of interest from 
the PRAAT output.  Volume and frequency was measured every 10 milliseconds. Next, each 
Pause (defined as consecutive assessments with no speech > 10 milliseconds) and Utterance 
(defined as consecutive speech > 150 milliseconds) was identified. For each Utterance, means 
and standard deviations were measured for volume and frequency. Using these measurements for 
each frame, the following variables were calculated: 
“Alogia” was examined using the following variables: (i) Total Number of 
Pauses, (ii) Mean Pause Length, (iii) Total Number of Utterances, and (iv) Mean Utterance 
Length.  
“Blunted Affect” was examined using the following variables: (i) Local Emphasis 
(i.e., mean standard deviation of volume values); (ii) Global Emphasis (i.e., the standard 
deviation of standard deviations of volume values); (iii) Local F0 Inflection (i.e., mean standard 
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deviations of fundamental frequency (F0) values); and (iv) Global F0 Inflection (i.e., the 
standard deviation of standard deviations of F0 values). For inclusion in these variable 
calculations, F0 values were log transformed to account for nonlinear distribution. In order to 
control for the fact that increased Utterance length provides greater opportunity to express 
variability in speech volume and frequency, each of these Blunted Affect variables was divided 
by (log-transformed) Mean Utterance Length (as matched by task condition), then multiplied by 
a constant (100) to increase ease of interpretability, given the small size of some resultant 
variables.  
“Formant Variables,” i.e., aspects of diminished verbal prosody that are 
associated with blunted range of oral movement, particularly with regard to vowel expression, 
were examined using the following variables: (i) Local F1 Inflection (i.e., mean of standard 
deviation of frequency related to vertical tongue movement (F1)); (ii) Global F1 Inflection (i.e., 
the standard deviation of standard deviations of F1 values); (iii) Local F2 Inflection (i.e., mean of 
standard deviation of frequency related to horizontal and back/forward tongue movement (F2)); 
and (iv) Global F2 Inflection (i.e., the standard deviation of standard deviations of F2 values). 
Standard deviations in F1 and F2 Inflection have been found to be associated with clinician-rated 
severity of negative symptoms (Covington, et al., 2012). For inclusion in these variable 
calculations, F1 and F2 values were log transformed to account for nonlinear distribution. In 
order to control for the fact that increased Utterance length provides greater opportunity to 
express variability in speech frequency, each of these Formant variables was divided by (log-
transformed) Mean Utterance Length (as matched by task condition), then multiplied by a 
constant (100) to increase ease of interpretability, given the small size of resultant variables. 
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Cognitive task performance 
Following the procedure set forth by Cohen, et al. (2011), hit rate and false alarms 
were calculated for the medium- and high-load cognitive tasks.Sensitivity was operationalized 
using d’, which takesinto account both correct hits and false alarms.  Increasing scoresreflect 
better performance (i.e., higher hit rate, lower false alarmrate). Response bias was 
operationalized using the natural log of theβ ratio statistic (“ln(β)”; used in lieu of β to account 
for skewed distribution of β) withincreasing scores indicating a more conservative bias (fewer 
correctand incorrect responses) and lower scores indicating a moreliberal bias (greater number of 
both correct and incorrect responses). 
Analyses 
Data distribution 
First, continuous demographic and dependent variables were examined for 
normality of distribution. Variables were then transformed to correct for skew and outlying data 
points where necessary, as indicated.  
Demographic variables 
Next, the three groups were compared on demographic variables obtained during 
the diagnostic screening interview (e.g., age, ethnicity, gender, education, and parents’ education 
level as an approximation of socioeconomic status unrelated to schizophrenia-specific 
educational or occupational functioning deficits).  Age, ethnicity, and gender were also examined 
as potential confounding variables to statistically control for in the primary analyses. All tests 
were two-tailed. 
Participant and parental educational variables were not examined for inclusion as 
covariates in the primary analyses, as cognitive resources (or effortful attempt to feign deficits in 
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such resources) are theoretically related to performance during the speech tasks (including verbal 
performance (Cohen et al., 2011; Melinder & Barch, 2003)), andboth patient and parental 
educational attainment are related to psychiatric status (e.g., Byrne, Agerbo, Eaton, & 
Mortensen, 2004; Chong, et al. 2009). Therefore, participant and parental educational variables 
might draw meaningful variance from the analyses if included therein. 
Primary analyses 
Each hypothesis was then tested by a series of mixed model ANOVAs (group (3) 
X cognitive (3) or affective load (4) condition)—looking primarily for (a) main effect of group, 
and (b) the group by condition interaction (i.e., differences in group patterns in the dependent 
variables across low and high cognitive or affective load). The Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was used where lack of sphericity was indicated.  Where multiple ANOVAs were run within a 
single family of variables, Bonferroni-corrected α-levels of .0125 (i.e., acoustic analysis sets for 
the Alogia, Blunt Affect, and Formant variables)or .025 (for cognitive task performance 
variables) were applied for main effects. Significant main effects were examined via Tukey tests 
where no covariates were included in the model, and via Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests for 
models including covariates. Significant interactions were examined using post-hoc simple-
effects analysis, utilizing a series of one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs (or dependent-
measures t-test for cognitive performance variables) for each group, across conditions (applying 
a Bonferroni-corrected α level of .017 to account for multiple group analyses). All tests were 
two-tailed.  
Feigning group post-task questionnaire 
Feigning group participants’ self-reported task strategies and confidence in 
feigning ability were also explored via post-hoc analysis. All tests were two-tailed. 
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Power Analysis 
Power analyses for the primary analyses were conducted using G*Power software 
3.1.2 (Buchner, 2009).  Because neither effect sizes nor correlation of dependent variables 
among within-group conditions have yet been established by existing literature for the groups to 
be examined herein, ranges of required sample sizes necessary to achieve statistical significance 
were calculated for each ANOVA using α = .05, power = .80, a range of both small (f = .25) and 
large (f = .40) effect sizes, and a range of both small (r = .10) and large (r = .75) correlations 
among repeated measures.  For the mixed model ANOVAs to be performed comparing the 
groups on the dependent variables in the affective load task (groups = 3, number of 
measurements = 4), power analysis indicated necessary minimum sample sizes ranging from 24 
(using f = .40; r = .10) to 129 (using f = .25; r = .75) total participants to detect differences in 
between-subject factors, and minimum sample sizes ranging from 9 (using f = .40; r = .75) to 54 
(using f = .25; r = .10) total participants to detect a group by condition interaction.  For the mixed 
model ANOVAs to be performed comparing the groups on the dependent variables in the 
cognitive load task (groups = 3, number of measurements = 3), power analysis indicated 
necessary minimum sample sizes ranging from 30 (using f = .40; r = .10) to 132 (using f = .25; r 
= .75) total participants to detect differences in between-subject factors, and minimum sample 
sizes ranging from 9 (using f = .40; r = .75) to 54 (using f = .25; r = .10) total participants to 
detect an interaction. Note that power analysis for main effects of condition was not computed, 
as it was anticipated that main effects of condition would be masked and/or rendered irrelevant 
by the more important group by condition interaction for each ANOVA. Furthermore, main 
effects of condition, alone, were not relevant to the purpose of the study, i.e., detection of 
feigning behavior.  
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This study achieved an actual total samples size of 121 (schizophrenia group n = 
52, control group n = 31, feigning group n = 40), falling on the higher side of the various ranges 
of suggested sample size. All 121 participants were used in the cognitive task performance 
analyses. However, due to quality issues with a small percentage of audio recordings, total 
samples sizes ranged from 102 – 105 for CDI analyses, and from 103 – 108 for CANS analyses.  
  
 
 
43 
 
RESULTS 
Data Distribution 
Continuous demographic and dependent variables were examined for normality of 
distribution. All continuous demographic variables (age, education, father’s education, and 
mother’s education) were normally distributed (skew values < .34, kurtosis values < 1.43). F0, 
F1, and F2 values were log-transformed to account for nonlinear distribution. CDI, Mean Pause 
Length, and Mean Utterance Length were also log-transformed to correct for positive skew 
(skew values > 2.00). Following transformations, scores of 13 participants (6 from the 
schizophrenia group, 6 from the feigning group, and 1 control) across 20 individual data points 
(out of 95 individualdependent variables) remained as significant outliers (data points with z-
scores > 3.29, as defined by Field (2005)). These outliers were replaced with scores equal to z-
score values of 3.29 (Field, 2005). Following this procedure, all transformed dependent variables 
were normally distributed (skew values < 1.42, kurtosis values < 1.55). 
Demographic Variables 
Group demographic differences, examined using Pearson’s Chi-square analysis 
for categorical dependent variables and one-way ANOVAs for continuous dependent variables, 
are set forth in Table 1. Significant main effects of group were further exploredby either 
examining the standardized residuals’ significance across cells (for Chi-square analysis) or 
byusing post-hoc Tukey tests (for ANOVAs). The schizophrenia group contained significantly 
more male participants than both the control and feigning groups(ps< .05); the gender 
distribution of the control and feigning groups did not significantly differ. Overall differences in 
ethnicity distribution across groups were significant, but post-hoc group comparison did not 
reveal significant differences. Participants in the feigning group were significantly younger than  
 
 
44 
 
 
Table 1: Group Demographic Differences 
 Control Feigning Schizophrenia Test Statistic
a
 
N 30 36 41  
Gender (%)    14.07*** 
 % Male
b 
45% 31% 67%  
 % Female 55% 69% 27%  
Ethnicity (%)
c
    7.42* 
 % Caucasian 48% 79% 60%  
 % African American 48% 21% 40%  
 % Hispanic/Latino 4% 0% 0%  
Age (M ± SD)
d
 40.68 ± 12.61 29.23 ± 10.71 41.63 ± 11.56 14.43*** 
Education Level (M ± SD)
e
 14.25 ± 2.34 15.13 ± 2.22 11.96 ± 1.96 27.59*** 
Father’s Education (M ± SD)f 12.29 ± 3.70 15.27 ± 3.06 13.24 ± 4.32 5.42** 
Mother’s Education (M ± SD)g 13.79 ± 2.67 15.08 ± 2.59 12.42 ± 2.96 7.14** 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
aPearson’s Chi-square analysis used to examine gender and ethnicity (χ2values provided); 
ANOVA used to examine age and education variables (F values provided).  
b
Schizophrenia > control = feigning 
c
 Due to lack of sufficient variability across the ethnicity variable, the African American and 
Hispanic/Latino categories were combined to form a single category, and an Chi-square analysis 
was performed using a dichotomous outcome variable (Caucasian v. non-Caucasian).  
d
 Feigning < schizophrenia = control 
e
 Schizophrenia < control = feigning 
f
 Feigning > control 
g
 Feigning > schizophrenia 
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both the control and schizophrenia participants (ps < .001); but age of control and schizophrenia 
participants did not significantly differ (p = .93). The schizophrenia group reported lower 
educational attainment than both the control and feigning groups (ps < .001), who did not 
significantly differ from one another in educational attainment (p = .39). Participants in the 
feigning group reported significantly higher paternal educational attainment than the control 
group, and significantly higher maternal educational attainment than the schizophrenia group (ps 
< .01); no other group differences in parental education were significant (ps > .10).  
Gender was examined using independent samples t-tests. Gender was 
significantly associated with CDI scores in the unpleasant/low arousal condition (t = -3.11, p< 
.01), with men (M = .52, SD = .32) having higher CDI scores than women (M =.33, SD = .30). 
Gender was also significantly associated with Total Number of Pauses and Mean Pause Length 
across all task conditions (ts > -2.04, ps < .05), except for Total Number of Pauses in 
unpleasant/high arousal affective reactivity task condition, in which gender demonstrated 
difference at a trend level (t = 1.09, p = .06). Women (range of means (Ms) = 157.21 – 198.33, 
range of standard deviations (SDs) = 53.43 – 5.04) made more pauses during the speech tasks 
than men (Ms = 131.26 – 175.96, SDs = 52.10 – 60.46); while men (Ms = 2.58 – 2.78,  SDs = 
.21– .27) took longer pauses than women (M = 2.48 – 2.65, SDs = .18 – .21). There were also 
significant gender differences in F0 Local and Global Inflection across all task conditions (ts > 
4.23, ps < .001), with women (M = 1.27 – 1.86, SDs = .40 – .75) using more F0 Local and 
Global Inflection in their speech than men (Ms = .88 – 1.28, SDs = .41 – .52).  Women (Ms = 
1.82 – 1.88, SDs = .77 – .92) expressed significantly more F1 Global Inflection than men(Ms = 
2.27 – 2.32, SDs = .96 – 1.02) across all conditions in the affective reactivity task (ts > 2.31, ps < 
.03), except the pleasant/low arousal condition, in which women used more F1 Global  
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Inflection than men (M = 2.18, SD = .89) at a trend level (t= -1.93, p = .06). There were no other 
significant gender differences across any remaining dependent variables (ts < 1.90, ps > .06). In 
summary, gender was not significantly associated with any of the cognitive performance 
dependent variables. It was, however, associated with CDI scores in the affective reactivity task. 
It was also associated with several acoustic analysis variables spanning Alogia, Blunt Affect, and 
Formant categories—there were gender differences across both cognitive load and affective 
reactivity tasks for Total Number of Pauses, Mean Pause Length, and Local and Global F0 
Inflection; as well as gender differences in F1 Global Inflection in the affective reactivity task.  
Ethnicity was also examined using independent samples t-tests (using Caucasian 
v. African American groups, due to lack of adequate distribution of participants among other 
ethnic groups). Ethnicity was significantly associated with CDI scores in the unpleasant/high 
arousal affective reactivity tasks condition (t = -2.40, p = .02), with African-American 
participants having higher CDI scores (M = .57, SD = .36) than Caucasians (M = .41, SD = .30). 
African Americans (M = .46, SD = .35) also demonstrated higher CDI scores than Caucasians (M 
= .35, SD = .29) in the pleasant/low arousal affective reactivity condition at a trend level (t = -
1.68, p = .10). Ethnicity was significantly associated with Global F0 Inflection in the low 
cognitive load condition (t = 2.30, p = .02), with Caucasian participants using more Global F0 
Inflection (M = 1.16, SD = .46) than African Americans (M = .95, SD = .44). African Americans 
(Ms = 2.72 – 2.82, SDs = .81 – .97) used more Local F2 Inflection than Caucasians (Ms = 2.37 – 
2.44, SDs = .76 – .83) across all conditions of the affective reactivity task (ts > -2.04, ps < .05), 
with the exception of the unpleasant/high arousal condition, in which African Americans (M = 
2.75, SD = .81) used more Local F2 Inflection than Caucasians (M = 2.47, SD = .80) at trend 
level (t = -1.79, p = .08). African Americans (Ms = 2.66 – 2.69, SDs = .77 – .91) also used more 
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Local F2 Inflection than Caucasians (Ms = 2.39 – 2.40, SDs = .68 – .78) in the medium and high 
cognitive load conditions at a trend level (ts > -1.84, ps < .09).  African Americans (M = 1.17, 
SD = .55) used significantly more Global F2 Inflection than Caucasians (M = .94, SD = .53) in 
the medium cognitive load condition (t = -2.16, p = .03), and African Americans (Ms = 1.13 – 
1.16, SDs = .56) used more Global F2 Inflection than Caucasians (Ms = .92 – .95, SDs = .56 – 
.58) in the low cognitive load and unpleasant/low arousal affective reactivity conditions (ts >-
1.82, ps < .08). There were no other significant ethnicity differences across any remaining 
dependent variables (ts < 1.60, ps > .12). In summary, ethnicity was not significantly associated 
with any of the cognitive performance dependent variables. It was, however, associated with CDI 
scores in the affective reactivity task. It was also associated with several acoustic analysis 
variables spanning Blunt Affect and Formant categories—there were differences among different 
ethnic groups in Local and Global F2 Inflection across both cognitive load and affective 
reactivity tasks; and there were differences among different ethnic groups in Global F0 Inflection 
in the cognitive load condition. 
 Age was examined using Pearson’s correlations. Age was significantly inversely 
correlated with Mean Pause Length in the low cognitive load condition (r = -.22, p = .02), and in 
the affective reactivity task across the pleasant/low arousal, pleasant/high arousal, and 
unpleasant/low arousal conditions (rs > -.20, ps = .05). It was also inversely correlated with 
Mean Pause Length in the unpleasant/high arousal condition at a trend level (r = -.17, p = .07). 
Age was significantly inversely correlated with Global F0 Inflection across all task conditions (rs 
> -.19, ps < .05), except the unpleasant/high arousal condition, in which it was inversely 
correlated with Global F0 Inflection at a trend level (r = -.17, p = .07). Age was significantly 
correlated with Global F1 Inflection in the medium cognitive load condition (r = .19, p = .05) 
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and the pleasant/high arousal affective reactivity condition (r = .20, p = .04). Age was 
significantly correlated with Local and Global F2 Inflection across all task conditions (rs > .29, 
ps < .01). Age was also significantly correlated with d’ scores in the medium cognitive load 
condition (r = .20, p = .03). Age was not significantly correlated with any other remaining 
dependent variables (rs < .17, ps > .08). In summary, age was not significantly correlated with 
any of the CDI variables. It was, however, associated with d’ scores in the cognitive load task, 
and several acoustic variables across Alogia, Blunt Affect, and Formant categories. Age was 
associated with Mean Pause Length, Global F0 and F1 Inflection, and Local and Global F2 
Inflection in both the cognitive load and affective reactivity tasks, and with Local F1 Inflection 
in the cognitive load task. 
Based on the above analyses, (a) gender was entered as a covariate for (i) all 
analyses examining Total Number of Pauses, Mean Pause Length, Local F0 Inflection, and 
Global F0 Inflection, and (ii) affective reactivity task analyses examining CDI scores and Global 
F1 Inflection; (b) ethnicity was entered as a covariate for (i) all analyses examining Local and 
Global F2 Inflection, (ii) the cognitive load task analysis examining Global F0 Inflection, and 
(iii) and the affective reactivity task analysis examining CDI scores; and (c) age was entered as a 
covariate for (i) all analyses examining Mean Pause Length, Global F0 Inflection, Global F1 
Inflection, Local F2 Inflection, and Global F2 Inflection, and (ii) the cognitive load task analysis 
examiningd’.  
Primary Analyses 
Affective Reactivity Speech Task 
A summary of significant results for the affective reactivity task is set forth in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2: Summary of significant affective reactivity task condition results 
Affective Reactivity Task 
Dependent variables (by category) Significant Effects
a
 
Group Condition Interaction 
CDI S > F = C   
Alogia    
 Total Number of Pauses C > S = F   
 Mean Pause Length F = S > C    
 Total Number of Utterances    
 Mean Utterance Length    
Blunt Affect    
 Local Emphasis    
 Global Emphasis    
 Local F0 Inflection    
 Global F0 Inflection    
Formant    
 Local F1 Inflection    
 Global F1 Inflection S > F   
 Local F2 Inflection C > S > F  C: P/ha > U/la = U/ha
b 
 Global F2 Inflection C = S > F   
a 
C = control group, S = schizophrenia group, F = feigning group, P/ha = pleasant/high arousal 
condition, U/ha = unpleasant/high arousal condition, U/la = unpleasant/low arousal condition
 
b 
This effect was not robust to Bonferroni-correction for family-wise error. 
 
 
CDI. Affective reactivity speech task means and standard deviations for CDI 
variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 3. Note, to aid interpretability, non-transformed 
CDI scores (i.e., number of speech errors made per 100 words generated) are provided.  
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Table 3: Means (± standard deviations) for CDI variables across groups, for affective reactivity 
task conditions 
CDI Control Feigning  Schizophrenia 
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 1.01 (1.24) 1.69 (2.25) 3.92 (5.01) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 1.76 (1.92) 1.28 (1.50) 3.81 (3.97) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 1.49 (1.30)  2.14 (3.64) 3.93 (4.43) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 2.25 (2.30) 1.80 (1.89) 4.54 (4.29) 
 
 
Results for the ANOVA examining CDI scores across groups and affective load 
condition, controlling for gender and ethnicity, are set forth in Table 4. There was a significant 
main effect for group, but the main effect of affective condition and the group by condition 
interaction were nonsignificant. Tukey post-hoc tests examining the main effect of group 
revealed that the schizophrenia group evidenced significantly more speech disorganization than 
both the control and feigning groups across conditions (ps < .001); but the feigning and control 
groups were not significantly different from one another (p = 1.00). See Figure 1.  
 
 
Table 4: ANOVA comparing groups on CDI scores, across affective reactivity task conditions 
(controlling for gender and ethnicity) 
 
 df F ηρ² p 
Group 2, 100 12.50 .20 < .001
a 
Condition 3, 300 1.52 .02 .21 
Group * Condition 6, 300 1.43 .03 .20 
a 
Schizophrenia > feigning = control
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Figure 1: Log transformed CDI scores across affective reactivity conditions 
 
Alogia.Affective reactivity speech task means and standard deviations for Alogia 
variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 5. Note, to aid interpretability, non-transformed 
Pause and Utterance scores are provided.  
Results for ANOVAs examining Alogia variables across affective reactivity 
conditions are set forth in Table 6. For Total Number of Pauses (controlling for gender) and 
Mean Pause Length (controlling for gender and age), there were significant effects for group, but 
no significant main effects of condition or interactions. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise 
comparisons revealed that the control group used significantly more pauses, with a shorter mean 
pause length, than either the schizophrenia (p< .01) or feigning groups (p< .01), who were not 
significantly different from one another (p = 1.00). There were no significant main effects or 
interactions for either Total Number of Utterances or Total Utterance Length. See Figure 2. 
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Table 5: Means (± standard deviations) for Alogia variables across groups, for affective 
reactivity task conditions 
 
Alogia Control Feigning  Schizophrenia 
Total Number of Pauses    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 204.74 (44.12) 157.72 (58.48) 157.38 (45.55) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 220.32 (51.04) 177.31 (62.47) 165.93 (51.62) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 214.37 (52.98) 167.25 (59.18) 166.29 (48.47) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 222.35 (48.15) 174.64 (64.86) 169.45 (47.62) 
Mean Pause Length    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 302.55 (119.94) 489.69 (250.74) 482.14 (276.91) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 273.16 (113.39) 409.47 (223.20) 464.74 (270.81) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 302.50 (131.88) 459.28 (234.30) 455.71 (257.45) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 278.16 (105.98) 442.96 (294.25) 443.00 (285.45) 
Total Number of Utterances    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 72.77 (17.07) 59.56 (15.58) 65.93 (19.94) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 66.97 (18.10) 60.22 (18.41) 64.33 (16.98) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 70.23 (17.28) 62.81 (18.46) 65.38 (17.67) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 68.74 (4.73) 62.58 (20.15) 63.50 (16.40) 
Mean Utterance Length    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 1431.48 (364.23) 1758.56 (550.07) 1641.29 (549.75) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 1564.58 (415.20) 1767.45 (554.71) 1651.40 (512.38) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 1481.97 (374.96) 1678.84 (493.30) 1602.67 (441.04) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 1490.00 (313.37) 1715.83 (542.89) 1679.83 (573.64) 
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Table 6: ANOVAs comparing groups on Alogia variables, across affective reactivity task 
conditions 
 
Alogia df F ηρ² p 
Total Number of Pauses 
(controlling for gender) 
    
 Group 2, 103 .82 .16 < .001
a
 
 Condition 3, 309 1.11 .01 .35 
 Group * Condition 6, 309 .52 .01 .80 
Mean Pause Length  
(controlling for gender and age) 
    
 Group 2, 102 7.99 .14 .001
b
 
 Condition 3, 306 .18 .00 .91 
 Group * Condition 6, 306 1.13 .02 .35 
Total Number of Utterances     
 Group 2, 105 2.09 .04 .13 
 Condition 3, 315 1.14 .01 .23 
 Group * Condition 6, 315 1.13 .02 .35 
Mean Utterance Length     
 Group 2, 105 2.28 .04 .11 
 Condition 3, 315 1.37 .01 .25 
 Group * Condition 6, 315 .64 .01 .53 
a
 Control > schizophrenia = feigning  
b
Schizophrenia = feigning > control  
 
 
In summary, the control group used significantly more pauses, with a shorter 
mean pause length, than either the schizophrenia or feigning groups.  In other words, the feigning 
group successfully resembled the schizophrenia group in its use of longer (and conversely fewer 
overall) pauses. Notably, the main effects of group for Total Pause Number (p< .001) and Mean 
Pause Length (p = .001) were robust to application of a Bonferroni-correction for family-wise 
error within the Alogia analysis set.  
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Figure 2: Alogia scores across affective reactivity conditions 
 
Honest Controls Feigning Group Schizophrenia 
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Blunt Affect.Affective reactivity speech task means and standard deviations for 
Blunt Affect variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 7. Emphasis and Inflection scores are 
provided as log-transformed and corrected for Mean Utterance Length. 
 
Table 7: Means (± standard deviations) for Blunt Affect variables across groups, for affective 
reactivity task conditions 
 
Blunt Affect Control Feigning  Schizophrenia 
Local Emphasis    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 252.96 (44.21) 266.99 (72.12) 256.94 (49.21) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 261.19 (42.26) 269.06 (75.42) 261.24 (47.06) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 261.27 (45.26) 263.60 (71.94) 254.45 (55.22) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 257.43 (40.73) 270.01 (68.87) 258.93 (49.52) 
Global Emphasis    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 80.86 (18.51) 86.61 (23.49) 87.86 (20.30) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 87.06 (19.78) 86.91 (27.76) 87.59 (25.86) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 84.37 (19.88) 89.64 (27.25) 88.56 (24.52) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 89.56 (17.49) 86.96 (23.94) 85.28 (22.29) 
Local F0 Inflection    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 1.61 (.77) 1.62 (.74) 1.30 (.63) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 1.64 (.52) 1.59 (.57) 1.38 (.64) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 1.66 (.79) 1.58 (.61) 1.31 (.56) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 1.67 (.56) 1.68 (.66) 1.44 (.69) 
Global F0 Inflection    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 1.19 (.45) 1.22 (.45) .93 (.51) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 1.16 (.50) 1.17 (.44) .98 (.51) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 1.17 (.53) 1.21 (.39) .97 (.51) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 1.19 (.43) 1.18 (.44) .96 (.50) 
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Results for ANOVAs examining Blunt Affect variables across affective reactivity 
conditions are set forth in Table 8. There were no significant main effects or interactions for 
Local or Global Emphasis, or Local (controlling for gender) or Global F0 (controlling for gender 
and age) Inflection. See Figure 3. 
 
Table 8: ANOVAs comparing groups on Blunt Affect variables, across affective reactivity task 
conditions 
 
Blunt Affect df F ηρ² p 
Local Emphasis     
 Group 2, 105 .38 .01 .69 
 Condition 3, 315 1.02 .01 .39 
 Group * Condition 6, 315 .62 .01 .71 
Global Emphasis     
 Group 2, 105 .13 .00 .88 
 Condition 2.74, 287.23 .40 .00 .73 
 Group * Condition 5.47, 287.23 .76 .01 .59 
Local F0 Inflection 
(controlling for gender) 
    
 Group 2, 103 .96 .02 .39 
 Condition 3, 309 1.10 .01 .35 
 Group * Condition 6, 309 .32 .01 .93 
Global F0 Inflection 
(controlling for gender and age) 
    
 Group 2, 102 1.15 .03 .24 
 Condition 3, 306 .43 .00 .73 
 Group * Condition 6, 306 .13 .00 .99 
 
 
 
57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Log transformed and corrected Blunt Affect scores across affective reactivity conditions
 Honest Controls  Feigning Group  Schizophrenia 
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Formant variables.Affective reactivity speech task means and standard 
deviations for Formant variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 9. Inflection scores are 
provided as log-transformed and corrected for Mean Utterance Length. 
 
Table 9: Means (± standard deviations) for Formant variables across groups, for affective 
reactivity task conditions 
 
Formant  Control Feigning  Schizophrenia 
Local F1 Inflection    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 4.39 (1.05) 4.23 (2.28) 4.74 (1.56) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 4.42 (.86) 4.45 (2.26) 4.74 (1.81) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 4.39 (1.10) 4.24(2.31) 4.80 (1.65) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 4.40 (1.01) 4.51 (2.26) 4.92 (1.48) 
Global F1 Inflection    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 2.02 (.63) 1.67 (1.01) 2.30(.98) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 1.99 (.73) 1.79 (1.08) 2.32 (.88) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 1.99 (.56) 1.79 (1.19) 2.45 (.96) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 2.05 (.78) 1.84 (1.08) 2.29 (.81) 
Local F2 Inflection    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 3.08 (.72) 1.92 (.49) 2.68 (.87) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 3.26 (.68) 1.95 (.49) 2.63 (.94) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 3.03 (.62) 1.94 (.55) 2.62 (.83) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 3.02 (.70) 1.95 (.47) 2.79 (.75) 
Global F2 Inflection    
 Pleasant/Low-arousal 1.40 (.44) .54 (.42) 1.22 (.57) 
 Pleasant/High-arousal 1.35 (.40) .51 (.30) 1.13 (.50) 
 Unpleasant/Low-arousal 1.31 (.41) .53 (.41) 1.18 (.53) 
 Unpleasant/High-arousal 1.36 (.41) .51 (.38) 1.22 (.50) 
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Results for ANOVAs examining Formant variables across affective reactivity 
conditions are set forth in Table 10. There were no significant main effects or interaction for 
Local F1 Inflection(controlling for gender and age).  For Global F1 Inflection there was a 
significant main effect of group, but no significant main effect of condition or interaction. Post-
hoc Tukey tests revealed that the feigning group used significantly less Global F1 Inflection than 
the schizophrenia group (p< .01); but the control group was not significantly different from 
either other group (ps > .17). See Figure 4. 
For Local F2 Inflection (controlling for ethnicity and age), there was a significant 
main effect of group and a significant group by condition interaction. Bonferroni-corrected post-
hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that all three groups were significantly different from one 
another, with the feigning group using less Local F2 Inflection than both the schizophrenia and 
control groups (ps < .001), and the schizophrenia group using less Local F2 Inflection than the 
control group (p = .03). With regard to the interaction effect, post-hoc simple-effects analysis 
revealed a significant effect of condition within the control group (F (3, 87) = 3.91, ηρ² = .12, p = 
.01), which remained significant after application of Bonferroni correction; with Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons indicating that control participants used more Local F2 
Inflection in the pleasant/high arousal condition than both the unpleasant/low arousal (p = .03) 
and unpleasant/high arousal (p = .05) conditions (ps for all other pairwise comparisons > .55). 
The main effect of condition was not significant within the feigning (F (2.43, 84.97) = .22, ηρ² = 
.01, p = .84) or schizophrenia (F (2.02, 82.78) = 1.56, ηρ² = .04, p = .22) groups. See Figure 4. 
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Table 10: ANOVAs comparing groups on Formant variables, across affective reactivity task 
conditions 
 
Formant variables df F ηρ² p 
Local F1 Inflection  
(controlling for gender and age) 
    
 Group 2, 102 .54 .01 .59 
 Condition 2.78, 283.02 1.92 .02 .13 
 Group * Condition 5.55, 283.02 1.51 .03 .18 
Global F1 Inflection     
 Group 2, 105 5.25 .09 .01
a
 
 Condition 3, 315 .34 .00 .80 
 Group * Condition 6, 315 .68 .01 .67 
Local F2 Inflection 
(controlling for ethnicity and age) 
    
 Group 2, 103 20.23 .28 <.001
b
 
 Condition 2.62, 269.49 1.14 .01 .33 
 Group * Condition 5.23, 269.49 2.29 .04 .04
c
 
Global F2 Inflection 
(controlling for ethnicity and age) 
    
 Group 2, 103 28.18 .36 <.001
d
 
 Condition 2.75, 282.95 1.23 .01 .29 
 Group * Condition 5.49, 282.95 .71 .01 .63 
a
 Schizophrenia > feigning 
b
 Control > schizophrenia > feigning 
c
 Control group: pleasant/high arousal > unpleasant/low arousal = unpleasant/high arousal (Note: 
this effect was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni-correction.) 
d
Schizophrenia = control > feigning  
 
For Global F2 Inflection (controlling for ethnicity and age), the main effect of 
group was significant, but not the main effect of condition or the interaction. Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that the feigning group used significantly less 
Global F2 Inflection than the schizophrenia and control groups (ps < .001); but schizophrenia 
and control groups did not significantly differ from one another (p = .36). See Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Corrected and log-transformed Formant variable scores across affective reactivity conditions
 Honest Controls  Feigning Group  Schizophrenia 
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In summary, the feigning group used less F1 Global, F2 Local, and F2 Global 
Inflection than the schizophrenia group. In other words, the feigning group tended to use poor 
formant inflection (less tongue movement-based articulation) in attempt to mimic schizophrenia 
symptoms. Notably, all three of these main group effects were robust to application of 
Bonferroni correction to account for potential family-wise error within the Formant variable 
set(F1 Global Inflection group effect p = .007, F2 Local and Global Inflection group effect ps < 
.001). The feigning group’s strategy distinguished it from the control group for F2 Local and 
Global Inflection, in a direction matching that distinguishing the schizophrenia group from the 
control group with regard to Local F2 Inflection (i.e., the schizophrenia group also used less 
Local F2 Inflection than controls). However, the feigning group over-exaggerated this effect, 
using significantly less F1 Global, F2 Local, and F2 Global Inflection than even the 
schizophrenia group. Furthermore, even though the control group demonstrated slight affective 
reactivity for Local F2 Inflection in the pleasant/high arousal condition, the feigning group 
appeared to remain steady across affective conditions. However, this interaction effect (p = .04) 
was not robust to Bonferroni-correction for family-wise error.  
Cognitive load speech task 
A summary of significant results for the cognitive load task is set forth in  
Table 11. 
CDI.Cognitive load speech task means and standard deviations for CDI variables, 
across groups, are set forth in Table 12. Note, to aid interpretability, non-transformed CDI scores 
(i.e., number of speech errors made per 100 words generated) are provided.  
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Table 11: Summary of significant cognitive load task condition results 
Dependent variables (by category) Significant Effects
a
 
Group Condition Interactions 
CDI  l > h  
Alogia    
 Total Number of Pauses C > S = F l > m > h
b
 C: l = m> h  
F: l > m = h 
S: l > m = h 
 Mean Pause Length F = S > C   
 Total Number of Utterances C > S l>h S: l > m = h 
 Mean Utterance Length S>C h>l S: h > l
b
 
Blunt Affect    
 Local Emphasis    
 Global Emphasis    
 Local F0 Inflection    
 Global F0 Inflection C > S
b
   
Formant    
 Local F1 Inflection    
 Global F1 Inflection    
 Local F2 Inflection C > S > F   
 Global F2 Inflection C > S > F   
Cognitive Performance    
 d’ C > S > F m > h S: l > h 
C: l > h 
 ln(β) C = S > F  m > hb  
a 
C = control group, S = schizophrenia group, F = feigning group, l = low cognitive load 
condition, m = medium cognitive load condition, h = high cognitive load condition
 
b
 This effect was not robust to Bonferroni-correction for family-wise error. 
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Table 12: Means (± standard deviations) for CDI variables across groups, for cognitive load task 
conditions 
 
 Control Feigning  Schizophrenia 
CDI    
 Low Load 1.02 (1.73) 1.88 (3.23) 3.13 (3.60) 
 Medium Load .85 (1.02) 1.58 (3.12) 3.50 (13.11) 
 High Load  1.04 (1.20) 1.48 (3.20)  1.37 (1.89) 
 
 
Results for the ANOVA examining CDI scores across groups and cognitive load 
conditions are set forth in Table 13. There was no significant main effect of group, but there was 
a significant main effect for cognitive load condition. The group by cognitive load condition 
interaction was not significant. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons examining 
the main effect of cognitive load condition revealed significantly more speech disorganization in 
the low cognitive load condition than the high load condition (p = .01). The medium load 
condition was not significantly different from the high load condition (p = 1.0), but differed from 
the low load condition at a trend level (p = .10). See Figure 5.  
 
 
Table 13: ANOVA comparing groups on CDI scores, across cognitive load task conditions 
 df F ηρ² P 
Group 2, 99 1.67 .03 .19 
Condition 1.80, 11.91 4.04 .04 .02
a
 
Group * Condition 3.77, 186.65 1.91 .04 .11 
a
 low > high load condition 
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Figure 5: Log-transformed CDI scores across cognitive load conditions 
 
Alogia. Cognitive load speech task means and standard deviations for Alogia 
variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 14. Note, to aid interpretability, non-transformed 
pause and utterance scores are provided.  
Results for ANOVAs examining Alogia variables across cognitive load 
conditions are set forth in Table 15. For Total Pause Number (controlling for gender), there were 
significant main effects for group and condition, as well as a significant group by condition 
interaction. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that the control group 
used significantly more pauses than either the feigning (p< .01) or schizophrenia (p< .001) 
groups; but the feigning and schizophrenia groups were not significantly different from one 
another (p = 1.00). In addition, participants used significantly more pauses in the low cognitive 
load condition than either other condition (ps < .001), and more pauses in the medium cognitive 
load condition than the low cognitive load condition (p< .001). With regard to the interaction 
effect, post-hoc simple-effects analysis revealed a significant effect of condition within the  
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Table 14: Means (± standard deviations) for Alogia variables across groups, for cognitive load 
task conditions 
 
Alogia Control Feigning  Schizophrenia 
Total Number of Pauses    
 Low Load 209.20 (54.51) 170.28 (63.04) 158.95 (51.35) 
 Medium Load 198.17 (48.43) 144.77 (50.71) 134.14 (52.71) 
 High Load  167.77 (48.05) 153.63 (61.39) 116.88 (45.14) 
Mean Pause Length    
 Low Load 316.33 (128.05) 454.03 (272.32) 504.19 (382.26) 
 Medium Load 346.66 (139.49) 575.81 (313.85) 755.62 (749.33) 
 High Load  459.97 (209.05) 548.69 (292.48) 790.40 (556.23) 
Total Number of Utterances    
 Low Load 71.03 (18.60) 63.94 (19.20) 62.74 (18.93) 
 Medium Load  71.38 (16.71) 59.40 (17.86) 58.79 (20.15) 
 High Load 67.13 (18.60) 62.86 (21.90) 51.29 (19.09) 
Mean Utterance Length    
 Low Load 1483.73 (408.23) 1703.95 (652.71) 1751.02 (694.51) 
 Medium Load 1452.83 (352.25) 1808.97 (655.21) 1910.81 (865.72) 
 High Load  1580.80 (487.89) 1735.97 (579.79) 2235.02 (1106.64) 
 
 
control group (F (2, 56) = 33.41, ηρ² = .54, p< .001), which remained robust to application of the 
Bonferroni correction; with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise-comparisons revealing that 
the control group used significantly fewer pauses in the high cognitive load condition than both 
the low and medium load conditions (ps < .001), but the low and medium load conditions were 
not significantly different from one another (p = .08). Within the feigning group, there was a 
significant effect of condition (F (1.60, 52.71) = 5.39, ηρ² = .14, p = .01),which remained robust 
to application of Bonferroni correction; with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise-
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comparisons revealing that the feigning group used significantly more pauses in the low 
cognitive load condition than both the medium (p = .01) and high (p = .03) cognitive load 
conditions, but the medium and high cognitive load conditions were not significantly different 
from one another (p = 1.00). Within the schizophrenia group, there was a significant main effect 
of condition (F (2, 82) = 16.24, ηρ² = .28, p< .001), which remained robust to application 
Bonferroni correction, with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise-comparisons revealing that 
the schizophrenia group used significantly more pauses in the low cognitive load condition than 
both the medium (p = .01) and high (p< .001) cognitive load conditions, but the medium and 
high cognitive load conditions were not significantly different from one another (p = .06). See 
Figure 6. 
For Mean Pause Length (controlling for gender and age), there was a significant 
main effect of group, but no significant main effect of condition or interaction. Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that the mean length of pauses for the control 
group was shorter than that of either the schizophrenia (p< .001) or feigning (p = .04) groups, but 
the schizophrenia and feigning groups did not differ from one another (p = .92). See Figure 6. 
For Total Number of Utterances, there were significant main effects of group and 
condition, as well as a significant interaction. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that the 
schizophrenia group made significantly fewer utterances than the control group (p = .01), but the 
feigning group did not significantly differ from either other group (ps > .15). Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that there were more utterances made during 
the low than the high cognitive load conditions (p < .001), but the medium load condition was 
not significantly different from either other condition (ps > .12). With regard to the interaction 
effect, post-hoc simple-effects analysis revealed a significant effect of condition within the  
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Table 15: ANOVAs comparing groups on Alogia variables, across cognitive load task conditions 
Alogia df F ηρ² p 
Total Pause Number  
(controlling for gender) 
    
 Group 2, 100 9.90 .17 <.001
a
 
 Condition 2, 200 4.10 .04 .02
b
 
 Group * Condition 4, 200 3.79 .07 .01
c
 
Mean Pause Length 
(controlling for gender and age) 
    
 Group 2, 99 8.17 .14 .001
d
 
 Condition 1.82, 180.08 .19 .00 .81 
 Group * Condition 3.64, 180.08 1.79 .04 .14 
Total Utterance Number     
 Group 2, 102 4.62 .08 .01
e
 
 Condition 2, 204 7.06 .07 .001
f
 
 Group * Condition 4, 204 3.74 .07 .01
g
 
Mean Utterance Length     
 Group 2, 102 4.46 .10 .01
h
 
 Condition 1.77, 180.54 6.27 .06 < .01
i
 
 Group * Condition 3.54, 180.54 3.63 .06 .01
j
 
a
 Control > schizophrenia = feigning 
b
 low load > medium > high (Note: this effect was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni-
correction.) 
c
 Controls: low = medium >high; feigning and schizophrenia: low > medium = high 
d
Schizophrenia = feigning> control  
e
 Control > schizophrenia 
f
low load>high 
g
 Schizophrenia: low > medium > high 
h
 Schizophrenia > control 
i
high load >low 
j
 Schizophrenia: high>low(Note: this interaction effect was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni-
correction.) 
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Figure 6: Alogia scores across cognitive load conditions
 Honest Controls  Feigning Group  Schizophrenia 
 
 
70 
 
schizophrenia group (F (2, 82) = 9.14, ηρ² = .18, p< .001), which was robust to Bonferroni 
correction; with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise-comparisons revealing that the 
schizophrenia group used significantly shorter utterances in the high cognitive load condition, as 
compared to both the low (p< .001) and medium (p = .04) load conditions, which were not 
significantly different from one another (p = .49). There were no significant main effects of 
condition within either the control (F (2, 56) = 2.20, ηρ² = .07, p = .12) or feigning (F (1.64, 
54.0) = 2.48, ηρ² = .07, p = .10) group. See Figure 6. 
For Mean Utterance Length, there were significant main effects of group and 
condition, as well as a significant interaction. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that the 
schizophrenia group had significantly longer utterances than the control group (p< .01), but the 
feigning group did not significantly differ from either other group (ps > .14). Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that participants made shorter utterances in 
the low than the high cognitive load condition (p< .001), but the medium cognitive load 
condition did not significantly differ from either other condition (ps > .29). With regard to the 
interaction effect, post-hoc simple-effects analysis revealed a significant effect of condition 
within the schizophrenia group (F (1.76, 72.01) = 7.96, ηρ² = .16, p = .001), which was robust to 
application of Bonferroni correction; with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise-comparisons 
revealing that the schizophrenia group used significantly longer utterances in the high cognitive 
load condition as compared to the low cognitive load condition (p< .001),but the medium load 
condition was not significantly different from either the low or high load conditions (ps > .08). 
There were no significant main effects of condition for either the control (F (2, 56) = 2.27, ηρ² = 
.08, p = .11) or feigning (F (1.67, 55.18) = 1.45, ηρ² = .04, p = .24) group. See Figure 6. 
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In summary, similar to performance on the affective reactivity task, on the 
cognitive load task the control group used significantly more pauses, with a shorter mean pause 
length, than either the schizophrenia or feigning groups.  In other words, the feigning group was 
able to successfully resemble the schizophrenia group in its use of longer (and conversely fewer 
overall) pauses. The control group also used more and longer utterances than the schizophrenia 
group. Notably, these main effects of group (ps ≤  .012) were robust to Bonferroni-correction for 
family-wise error within the Alogia analysis set.  For Total Pause Number, all three groups used 
fewer pauses as cognitive load increased; however, while this effect appeared to emerge when 
comparing the medium to high cognitive load condition for the control group, for the 
schizophrenia and feigning groups it emerged when comparing the low to medium load 
condition.  
With regard to both Total Utterance Number and Mean Utterance Length, only 
the schizophrenia group participants demonstrated significant change across the conditions, 
using fewer utterances as they moved from the low to medium condition, and longer utterances 
as they moved from the low to high condition. These interaction effects were not robust to 
Bonferroni-correction for family-wise error for Mean Utterance Length (p = .014), but they were 
robust to such correction for Total Pause Number (p = .005) and Total Utterance Number (p = 
.006). See Figure 6.  
Blunt Affect.Cognitive load speech task means and standard deviations for Blunt 
Affect variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 16. Emphasis and Inflection scores are 
provided as log-transformed and corrected for Mean Utterance Length. 
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Table 16: Means (± standard deviations) for Blunt Affect variables across groups, for cognitive 
load task conditions 
 
Blunt Affect Control Feigning  Schizophrenia 
Local Emphasis    
 Low Load 256.99 (47.47) 274.32 (79.16) 268.06 (58.65) 
 Medium Load 258.72 (56.41) 273.71 (71.96) 262.84 (62.01) 
 High Load  267.29 (48.66) 265.19 (72.10) 259.05 (65.45) 
Global Emphasis     
 Low Load 85.29 (20.84) 86.78 (28.06) 89.29 (23.55) 
 Medium Load 80.92 (17.61) 90.23 (29.87) 84.23 (22.89) 
 High Load  87.90 (19.89) 85.57 (28.09) 88.81(21.53) 
Local F0 Inflection    
 Low Load 1.60 (.67) 1.62 (.63) 1.24 (.53) 
 Medium Load 1.69 (.66) 1.59 (.70) 1.27 (.51) 
 High Load  1.56 (.53) 1.55 (.62) 1.22 (.48) 
Global F0 Inflection    
 Low Load 1.22 (.46) 1.21 (.43) .90 (.48) 
 Medium Load 1.22 (.47) 1.24 (.47) .90 (.46) 
 High Load  1.29 (.42) 1.29 (.46) .89 (.42) 
 
Results for ANOVAs examining Blunt Affect variables across cognitive load 
conditions are set forth in Table 17. For Local Emphasis, there were no significant main effects. 
There was a trend-level interaction, but post-hoc simple effects analysis did not reveal any 
significant main effects of condition within any groups (Fs < 1.93, ps > .15). There were no 
significant main effects or interactions for Global Emphasis. See Figure 7. 
There were no significant main effects or interactions for Local F0 Inflection 
(controlling for gender).  For Global F0 Inflection (controlling for gender, age, and ethnicity), 
there was a significant main effect of group, but no significant main effect of condition or  
 
 
73 
 
Table 17: ANOVAs comparing groups on Blunt Affect variables, across cognitive load task 
conditions 
 
Blunt Affect df F ηρ² p 
Local Emphasis     
 Group 2, 102 .22 .00 .80 
 Condition 1.86, 189.48 .22 .00 .79 
 Group * Condition 3.72, 189.48 2.36 .04 .06 
Global Emphasis     
 Group 2, 102 .28 .01 .76 
 Condition 2, 204 .43 .00 .64 
 Group * Condition 4, 204 1.20 .02 .31 
Local F0 Inflection 
(controlling for gender) 
    
 Group 2, 100 1.90 .04 .16 
 Condition 2, 200 1.49 .02 .23 
 Group * Condition 4, 200 .41 .01 .80 
Global F0 Inflection  
(controlling for gender, age, ethnicity) 
    
 Group 2, 98 4.16 .08 .02
a
 
 Condition 2, 16 .02 .00 .99 
 Group * Condition 4, 196 .25 .01 .91 
a
 Control > schizophrenia (Note: this effect was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni-correction.) 
 
 
interaction. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons revealed that the schizophrenia 
group used significantly less F0 Global Inflection than the control group (p = .02), but the 
feigning group was not significantly different from either other group (ps > .28). However, this 
main effect of group (p = .019) was not robust to application of a Bonferroni correction for 
family-wise error within Blunt Affect analysis set. See Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Corrected and log transformed Blunt Affect scores across cognitive load conditions
 Honest Controls  Feigning Group  Schizophrenia 
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Formant variables.Cognitive load speech task means and standard deviations for 
Formant variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 18. Inflection scores are provided as log-
transformed and corrected for Mean Utterance Length. 
 
Table 18: Means (± standard deviations) for Formant variables across groups, for cognitive load 
task conditions 
 
Formant variables Control Feigning  Schizophrenia 
Local F1 Inflection     
 Low Load 4.44 (1.00) 4.85 (2.62) 5.02 (1.61) 
 Medium Load 4.50 (1.39) 4.63 (2.33) 4.82 (1.66) 
 High Load  4.42 (1.06) 4.66 (2.37) 5.28 (1.89) 
Global F1 Inflection    
 Low Load 2.14 (.69) 2.06 (1.23) 2.39 (.90) 
 Medium Load 2.25 (.81) 2.09 (1.18) 2.42 (.88) 
 High Load  2.45 (.86) 2.25 (1.52) 2.66 (.98) 
Local F2 Inflection    
 Low Load 3.05 (.63) 2.02 (.51) 2.67 (.85) 
 Medium Load 3.00 (.92) 1.94 (.45) 2.60 (.77) 
 High Load  2.98 (.61) 1.95 (.44) 2.60 (.70) 
Global F2 Inflection    
 Low Load 1.38 (.41) .53 (.35) 1.21 (.55) 
 Medium Load 1.37 (.53) .59 (.36) 1.14 (.45) 
 High Load  1.52 (.44) .56 (.36) 1.15 (.46) 
 
 
 
Results for ANOVAs examining Formant variables across cognitive load 
conditions are set forth in Table 19. There were no significant main effects or interactions for 
Local F1 Inflection or Global F1 Inflection (controlling for age). For Local F2 Inflection 
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(controlling for ethnicity and age) there was a significant main effect of group, but no significant 
main effect of condition or group by condition interaction. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-
wise comparisons revealed that the control group used significantly more Local F2 Inflection 
than both the schizophrenia (p = .03) and feigning (p< .001) groups, and the schizophrenia used 
significantly more Local F2 Inflection than the feigning group (p< .01). See Figure 8. 
For Global F2 Inflection (correcting for ethnicity and age), there was a significant 
main effect of group, a trend-level main effect of condition, and a significant interaction. 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed that the control group used significantly more 
Global F2 Inflection than both the schizophrenia (p = .03) and feigning (p< .001) groups, and the 
schizophrenia used significantly more Global F2 Inflection than the feigning group (p< .001); but 
there were no significant differences among conditions (ps > .12). With regard to the interaction 
effect, however, post-hoc simple-effects analysisdid not reveal any significant effects of 
condition within any group, upon application of Bonferroni correction (Fs < 4.84, ps > .02). See 
Figure 8. 
In summary, similar to performance on the affective reactivity task, in the 
cognitive load task the feigning group used less F2 Local and Global Inflection than the 
schizophrenia and control groups. In other words, the feigning group tended to use poor formant 
inflection (i.e., less tongue movement-based articulation) in attempt to mimic schizophrenia 
symptoms. Notably, both main effects of group for these variables (ps < .001) were robust to 
application of Bonferroni correction to account for family-wise error within the Formant variable 
analysis set. The feigning group’s strategy did distinguish it from the control group for F2 Local 
and Global Inflection, in a direction matching that distinguishing the schizophrenia group from 
the control group (i.e., the schizophrenia group also used less Local and Global F2 Inflection 
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than the control group). However, the feigning group over-exaggerated this effect, such that it 
also used significantly less F2 Local and Global Inflection than the schizophrenia group. 
 
Table 19: ANOVAs comparing groups on Formant variables, across cognitive load task 
conditions 
 
Formant variables df F ηρ² p 
Local F1 Inflection     
 Group 1, 100 1.24 .02 .29 
 Condition 2, 200 1.32 .01 .27 
 Group * Condition 4, 200 1.11 .02 .35 
Global F1 Inflection 
(controlling for age) 
    
 Group 2, 99 .60 .01 .55 
 Condition 1.86, 184.30 1.41 .01 .32 
 Group * Condition 3.72, 184.30 1.11 .00 .98 
Local F2 Inflection 
(controlling for ethnicity and age) 
    
 Group 2, 98 14.72 .23 <.001
a
 
 Condition 1.85, 181.57 .66 .01 .51 
 Group * Condition 3.71 .04 .00 1.00 
Global F2 Inflection 
(controlling for ethnicity and age) 
    
 Group 2, 98 24.97 .34 <.001
a
 
 Condition 2, 196 2.89 .03 .06 
 Group * Condition 4, 196 4.51 .08 <.01
b
 
a
 Control > schizophrenia > feigning.  
b
 Post-hoc analysis did not reveal any significant differences across conditions for any group. 
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Figure 8: Corrected and log transformed Formant variable scores across cognitive load conditions
 Honest Controls  Feigning Group  Schizophrenia 
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Cognitive task performance.Cognitive load speech task means and standard 
deviations for cognitive task performance variables, across groups, are set forth in Table 20. 
 
Table 20: Means (± standard deviations) for cognitive task performance variables across groups, 
for cognitive load task conditions 
 
Cognitive Task 
Performance 
Control Feigning  Schizophrenia 
d’     
 Medium Load 3.38(.30) .64(1.31) 2.36(1.49) 
 High Load  1.06(1.58) .78(1.35) -.01(1.70) 
ln(β)       
 Medium Load .39(.45) .08(.46) .27(.50) 
 High Load  .28(.73) -.08(.45) .11(.64) 
 
 
Results for ANOVAs examining cognitive task performance variables are set 
forth in Table 21. For d’ performance values across groups and medium to high cognitive load 
conditions (controlling for age), there were significant main effects of group and condition, and a 
significant group by condition interaction. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise comparisons 
revealed that the control group performed significantly better than both the schizophrenia (p = 
.001) and feigning groups (p< .001), and the schizophrenia group performed better than the 
feigning group at a trend level (p = .06); and participants performed better under medium than 
high cognitive load (p < .001). Post-hoc simple-effects analysis of the interaction effect revealed 
that both the control (t = 8.28, p< .001), and schizophrenia (t = 10.56, p< .001) groups performed 
significantly worse in the high load condition, as compared to the medium load condition; but the 
feigning group’s performance was not significantly different across conditions (t = -.51, p = .62). 
See Figure 9. 
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Table 21: ANOVAs comparing groups on cognitive task performance variables, across medium 
and high cognitive load task conditions 
 
 df F ηρ² p 
d’ (controlling for age)     
 Group 2, 117 16.32 .22 < .001
a
 
 Condition 1, 117 6.20 .05 .01
b
 
 Group * Condition 2, 117 23.27 .29 < .001
c
 
ln(β)     
 Group 2, 118 7.06 .11 .001
d
 
 Condition 1, 118 4.11 .03 .05
e
 
 Group * Condition 2, 118 .05 .00 .95 
a
 Control > schizophrenia > feigning 
b
 Medium load > high load 
c
Schizophrenia and control: low > high 
d
Control = schizophrenia > feigning  
e
 Medium load > high load (Note: this effect was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni-
correction.) 
 
 
For ln(β) performance values across groups and medium to high cognitive load 
conditions, there were significant main effects of group and condition, but no significant group 
by condition interaction. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that the feigning group’s ln(β) values 
were significantly lower than those of the control (p = .001) and schizophrenia (p = .05) groups, 
indicating that the feigning group demonstrated a relatively moreliberal bias (i.e., greater number 
of both correct and incorrect responses); but the schizophrenia and control groups were not 
significantly different from one another (p = .23). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pair-wise 
comparisons revealed that participants tended to have a more conservative bias (i.e., smaller 
number of both correct and incorrect responses) in the medium cognitive load condition as 
compared to the high cognitive load condition, where they tended to show a more liberal bias (p 
= .05). See Figure 9. 
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Figure 9:Cognitive performance variables across medium and high cognitive load conditions 
 
 
In summary, the feigning group performed worse than both the schizophrenia and 
control groups on the cognitive task, and failed to demonstrate the pattern of impairment 
demonstrated by both the schizophrenia and control groups (i.e., lowered accuracy in the high as 
compared to medium cognitive load condition). The feigning group also demonstrated a more 
liberal bias (i.e., more correct and incorrect responses) than the schizophrenia or control groups. 
Notably, the main effects of group for both d’ and ln(β),the main effect of condition (p = .014) 
and the group by condition interaction for d’, were robust to Bonferroni correction (although the 
main effect of condition was not for ln(β)). 
Feigning group post-task questionnaire 
Table 22 sets forth feigning group participants’ responses to a post-task 
questionnaire about their performance on the speech tasks.  
 
 
 Honest Controls  Feigning Group  Schizophrenia 
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Table 22: Summary of feigning group participants’ responses to the post-task questionnaire 
(indicating % endorsing each response choice) 
1. How confident are your performance on these tasks would have successfully convinced 
an examiner that you have schizophrenia? 
Not at all Slightly Fairly Quite Very 
30% 32% 23% 15% 0% 
2. Which symptoms of schizophrenia did you focus on simulating in your attempt to 
convince the examiner that you have schizophrenia (indicate all that apply)? 
Hallucinations Delusions Thought 
Disorder 
Negative 
Symptoms 
Cognitive 
Symptoms 
 
53% 50% 65% 48% 53% 
3. In addition to the information provided by the examiner, did you rely on any other 
additional sources of information about schizophrenia in creating your strategy for 
attempting to convince the examiner that you have schizophrenia (indicate all that 
apply)?  
Know/work with 
someone with serious 
mental illness 
Movies or 
television 
News Educational 
materials (e.g., 
psychology class) 
 
Relied only on 
information 
provided  
Other 
33% 48% 28% 43% 15% 10% 
 
 
Overall, participants were not highly confident in their ability to feign 
schizophrenia symptoms. Though 65% of feigning participants reported that they attempted to 
portray thought disorder (the symptom category with the highest endorsement with regard to 
feigning strategy), as a whole the feigning group was not successfully able to feign cognitive 
disorganization as measured by the CDI. Furthermore, there were no significant differences 
between individuals who reported that they attempted to simulate thought disorder and those 
who did not on CDI scores across any of the speech task conditions (ts < .92, ps > .36). There 
were also no significant differences between those who endorsed attempted simulation of 
cognitive symptoms (53%) and those who did not on any cognitive performance variables (ts < 
1.43, ps > .16). 
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There were a few (mostly trend-level) differences between those who endorsed 
attempted simulation of negative symptoms (48%) and those who did not on verbal expressivity 
variables. Interestingly, those who endorsed simulation of negative symptoms used significantly 
more Local F2 Inflection in the unpleasant/high-arousal affective reactivity condition (M = 2.09, 
SD = .53) than those who did not (M = 1.78, SD = .35; p = .05). They also used more Local F2 
Inflection in the high cognitive load condition (endorsing: M = 2.08, SD = .50; not endorsing: M 
= 1.82, SD = .33; p= .07), pleasant/high arousal condition (endorsing: M = 2.09, SD = .46; not 
endorsing: M = 1.80, SD = .49; p = .08), and unpleasant/low-arousal condition (endorsing: M = 
2.04, SD = .49; not endorsing: M = 1.79, SD = .47; p = .06) at a trend level. It is thus unclear 
what those who thought they were portraying negative symptoms were attempting to 
behaviorally display. In any event, it should be recalled that as a group the feigners were not 
successful in using low levels of F2 Inflection to accurately feign negative symptoms, as they 
significantly under-articulated their speech so as to be distinguishable from the schizophrenia 
group. There were no other significant differences between those who endorsed attempted 
simulation of negative symptoms and those who did not on any other verbal expressivity 
variables (ts < 1.67, ps > .10).  
Confidence in feigning ability was significantly correlated (using nonparametric 
Spearman correlations) with CDI scores in the pleasant/low-arousal condition (r = .42, p = .01), 
Global F1 Inflection in the unpleasant/high arousal condition (r = .39, p = .02), and Global F2 
Inflection in the pleasant/high arousal condition (r = .33, p = .05). It was also correlated with 
Global Intensity in the pleasant/low-arousal condition (r = .31, p = .07), Global F1 Inflection in 
the pleasant/low arousal (r = .29, p = .09) and unpleasant/low-arousal (r = .29, p = .08) 
conditions, and Global F2 Inflection in the unpleasant/low-arousal condition (r = .31, p = .06) at 
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trend levels.Again, though, it should be recalled that high levels of Formant Inflection were 
associated with identifiable feigning, as those in the feigning group demonstrated higher levels of 
expressivity deficits than individuals in the schizophrenia group. There were no significant 
correlations between feigning group confidence level and any other dependent variables (rs < 
.28, ps > .10). 
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DISCUSSION 
This study sought to examine whether certain characteristics of speech 
disorganization and verbal flattening would discriminate between individuals with schizophrenia 
and healthy adults instructed to feign symptoms of schizophrenia. The hypotheses of this study 
generally predicted that the schizophrenia group would demonstrate more referential failures and 
expressivity deficits than either the controls or feigning group, who would not differ significantly 
from one another on these variables; and that the schizophrenia group would show a pattern of 
exacerbation of these disorganization and negative symptoms that was larger in magnitude than 
either the control or feigning group as cognitive and affective load increased by task condition. 
In addition, this study predicted that the feigning group would perform worse than either the 
schizophrenia or control groups on a series of cognitive performance tasks (although the 
schizophrenia group would also be expected to perform worse than the control group); and that 
the schizophrenia and control groups would demonstrate a pattern of lowered accuracy in the 
high, as compared to the medium, cognitive load condition (reflecting true effort spread across 
conditions of variable difficulty), but the feigning group would not, possibly even performing 
worse in the lower load condition, due to intentionally poor performance that was not sensitive to 
item difficulty level.  These hypotheses were partially supported.  
The first hypothesis predicted that in the affective reactivity speech task there 
would be (i) significant main effects for participant group, such that the schizophrenia group 
would demonstrate significantly more overall referential failures and expressivity deficits than 
both the honest control group and feigners, who would not differ from one another; and (ii) 
significant condition by group interactions, such that the magnitude of increase in referential 
failures and expressivity deficits for the schizophrenia group in comparing the pleasant condition 
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to the unpleasant condition and/or the low-arousal to high-arousal condition would be 
significantly larger than for controls or feigners.   
With regard to main effects of group, this predicted pattern was found only for 
CDI scores. However, there was no main effect of condition or interaction for CDI scores across 
affective reactivity conditions. Thus, the prior findings of Docherty et al., that schizophrenia 
patients may demonstrate an increase in speech disorganization in discussion of affectively 
unpleasant, as compared to pleasant, topics (1998), and at a larger magnitude than that displayed 
by controls, first-degree relatives, or depressed patients (2001) were not replicated. This failure 
to replicate these prior findings may be due to the fact that the Docherty et al. (1998, 
2001)studies examined 10-minute speech samples, collected on separate days, which may have 
been more effective at inducing pleasant and unpleasant affective states than the 90 second 
speech samples collected, back-to-back, in the present study. In addition, unlike the present study 
in which the interviewer remained silent during the speech sample recording procedure in order 
to facilitate acoustic analysis procedures, the interviewers in the Docherty et al. (1998, 2001) 
studies interacted with the participants were necessary to keep participants focused on the 
instructed affective topic.  
With regard to Formant variables (i.e., vocal expressivity variables related to 
tongue movements), the feigning group was distinguishable from the schizophrenia group in the 
affective reactivity task, but through display of a pattern opposite that of the pattern predicted. 
The feigning group demonstrated less vocal inflection than the schizophrenia group for Global 
F1 Inflection, and less vocal inflection than both the schizophrenia and control groups for Local 
and Global F2 Inflection. In other words, these variables did distinguish the feigning group from 
the schizophrenia group in a pattern that would suggest feigning, but did so because the feigning 
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group over-exaggerated such symptoms. It appears as though, in an attempt to feign negative 
symptoms, the feigning group generally focused on using poor, mumbling, or slurry articulation; 
however, this strategy resulted in the feigning group exhibiting significantly greater expressivity 
deficits than even the schizophrenia group. The only significant interaction (for Local F2 
Inflection) for the affective reactivity task was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni-correction, 
and only indicated differential patterns of expressivity across affective reactivity conditions for 
the control group (i.e., relative increase in inflection in the pleasant/high arousal condition). 
Therefore, this interaction was not relevant to the goal of identification of feigned symptoms.  
By contrast, for Total Pause Number and Mean Pause Length (both variables in 
the Alogia category), feigning group participants actually more closely resembled the 
schizophrenia group in the affective reactivity task; and they were both distinguishable from the 
control group, which used more frequent and shorter pauses than either the schizophrenia or 
feigning group. In other words, on these dimensions of Alogia, participants in the feigning group 
appeared to successfully resemble the schizophrenia group in a manner that distinguished them 
from healthy controls, by demonstrating Alogia symptoms through use of longer (and conversely 
less frequent) pauses.  
The second hypothesis predicted, similarly, that in the cognitive load speech task 
there would be (i) significant main effects for participant group, such that the schizophrenia 
group would demonstrate significantly more overall referential failures and expressivity deficits 
than the honest control group and feigners, who would not differ from one another; and (ii) 
significant group by condition interactions, such that the magnitude of increase in referential 
failures and expressivity deficits for the schizophrenia group as working memory load increased 
would be significantly larger than for controls or feigners.   
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Main effects of condition were apparent on several of the dependent variables in 
the cognitive speech task,in a manner consistent with existing research examining cognitive load 
theory (Paas, et al., 2010; Sweller, 2010), in healthy adults and schizotypy (Cohen et al., 2011) 
and schizophrenia patients (e.g., Cohen et al., 2013, manuscript in preparation; Melinder & 
Barch, 2003). However, there were no significant main effects of group that demonstrated the 
predicted pattern of performance (i.e., that the feigning group would be distinguishable from the 
schizophrenia group because feigners would not successfully replicate disorganization or 
negative speech symptoms, and would therefore more closely resemble controls). Similar to the 
affective reactivity task, though, there were group differences in Formant variable 
performance—specifically, Local and Global F2 Inflection—that distinguished the feigning 
group from the schizophrenia and control groups on the cognitive load task due to the feigning 
group’s over-exaggeration of such symptoms. On Local and Global F2 Inflection, the 
schizophrenia group demonstrated significantly more verbal flattening than the control group; 
but the feigning group demonstrated significantly more verbal flattening than even the 
schizophrenia group. Again, it appears as though participants in the feigning group attempted to 
use poor, mumbling, or slurry articulation; but they over-shot the goal by exhibiting significantly 
greater expressivity deficits than even the schizophrenia group. 
Main effects of group for Total Utterance Number, Mean Utterance Length (both 
variables in the Alogia category) and Global F0 Inflection (a variable in the Blunt Affect 
category) on the cognitive load task only distinguished the schizophrenia and control groups 
(although group effects for Global F0 Inflection were not robust to family-wise Bonferroni 
correction).  Only the schizophrenia group demonstrated a differential pattern for Total Utterance 
Number and Mean Utterance Length across cognitive load conditions (although the interaction 
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for Mean Utterance Length was not robust to family-wise Bonferroni correction). The 
schizophrenia group appeared to use longer and fewer utterances as cognitive task difficulty 
increased. Qualitative examination of participants’ performance in the high cognitive load 
condition suggests that this may be due to the fact that participants in the schizophrenia group 
tended not to produce complete narratives in the high cognitive load condition, but instead began 
simply listing items that fell into the category suggested by the neutral task instructions (e.g., 
when asked to speak about “food” in the high load condition, participants in the schizophrenia 
group frequently provided responses such as “I like to eat [slowly listing different foods for the 
remainder of the speech sample]”). Therefore, speech patterns were simplified in response to the 
increase cognitive load, but not in a manner measured by the present variables in the anticipated 
direction (i.e., shorter utterances). Similarly, this response pattern (schizophrenia patients’ 
decreased use of complex narrative as cognitive load increased) may explain the lack of a 
significant group effect for the CDI variable in the cognitive load task.    
By contrast, similar to the affective load condition, for Total Pause Number and 
Mean Pause Length (both variables in the Alogia category), feigning group participants in the 
cognitive load task more closely resembled the schizophrenia group; and they were both 
distinguishable from the control group, which used more frequent and shorter pauses than either 
the schizophrenia or feigning group. In other words, on these dimensions of Alogia, participants 
in the feigning group did appear to successfully resemble the schizophrenia group in a manner 
that distinguished them from healthy controls, by demonstrating Alogia symptoms through use 
of longer (and conversely less frequent) pauses.  There was also a significant group by cognitive 
load condition interaction for Total Pause Number and Mean Pause Length. All three groups 
demonstrated a similar pattern of increasing Alogia as cognitive load increased. However, for the 
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control group this effect emerged in moving between the medium and high load conditions, 
whereas for both the feigning and schizophrenia groups this effect emerged earlier, when 
comparing the low and medium load conditions. In other words, the control group began to show 
a significant increase in Alogia (though pause use patterns) only when the cognitive load task 
increased from an easier to a more difficult level; but the schizophrenia and feigning groups 
began to show a significant increase in Alogia when the easier cognitive task was first 
introduced.  
The third hypothesis predicted that in the cognitive load speech task there would 
be (i) significant group effects, such that the feigners would demonstrate poorer overall cognitive 
performance compared to the schizophrenia group, who would in turn demonstrate poorer 
overall cognitive performance compared to the honest control group; and (ii) significant 
interactions, such that the schizophrenia and honest control groups would perform worse during 
conditions of higher working memory load than the medium cognitive load condition, but 
feigners would perform worse during the medium load condition than high load condition. This 
hypothesis was generally supported. The schizophrenia group demonstrated significantly worse 
accuracy (as measured by d’) than the control group on the cognitive performance task; but the 
feigning group demonstrated significantly worse accuracy than the schizophrenia group. The 
feigning group also demonstrated a more liberal bias (as measured by ln(β), representing a 
combination of more item hits and misses, possibly suggestive of either random responding or 
increased intentional misses) than either the control or schizophrenia groups. Additionally, 
differential group performance on the cognitive task partially supported the second part of this 
hypothesis, in that both the schizophrenia and control groups demonstrated the expected pattern 
of lowered accuracy in the high load condition, as comparedto the medium load condition; but 
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the feigning group did not, suggesting an intentionally poor performance that was not sensitive to 
item difficulty level. In other words, the feigning group simply performed poorly across both 
levels of item difficulty, at a magnitude that was unrealistic even for individuals with cognitive 
impairment symptoms typically found in schizophrenia.   
Significant results in this study (i.e., those relating to CDI, Alogia, Formant, and 
cognitive performance variables) may be considered along two dimensions: (i) the success or 
failure of the feigning group’s attempt to portray symptoms of thought disorganization,negative 
speech symptoms, and/or cognitive deficits, and (ii) the pattern of group effects or interactions 
determining the success or failure of the attempt. Thus, the following four patterns may be 
examined: (1) instances where the attempt to feign a symptom was unsuccessful because the 
feigning group’s performance was distinguishable from that of the schizophrenia group, and 
instead more closely resembled the control group; (2) instances where the attempt to feign a 
symptom was unsuccessful because the feigning group’s performance was distinguishable from 
both the schizophrenia and control groups, appearing overly impaired; (3) instances where the 
attempt to feign a symptom was unsuccessful because the feigning group failed to demonstrate 
the expected pattern of change across cognitive load conditions as demonstrated by both 
schizophrenia and control groups, and (4) instances in which the attempt to feign a symptom was 
successful, with the performance of the feigning group resembling that of the schizophrenia 
group, and both the feigning group and schizophrenia group being distinguished from controls. 
The first type of pattern—i.e., where the attempt to feign a symptom was 
unsuccessful because the feigning group’s performance was distinguishable from that of the 
schizophrenia group, and instead more closely resembled the control group—was evident in CDI 
performance in the affective reactivity speech task. In essence, even after being provided with a 
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specific description of disorganization symptoms, and despite the fact that 65% of participants in 
the feigning group reported that they attempted to feign thought disorder on the speech tasks, 
participants in the feigning group, on the whole, could not successfully mimic the pattern of 
referential failures commonly seen in schizophrenia. This is consistent with clinical observations 
made by Resnick and Knoll (2008). Furthermore, there were no significant differences between 
individuals in the feigning group who reported that they attempted to feign such symptoms and 
those who did not on CDI scores across any of the speech task conditions.  However, confidence 
level in overall feigning ability was positively correlated with CDI scores in the pleasant/low 
arousal affective reactivity condition, at a medium effect size. Thus, within a more confident 
subset of the feigning group there may have been some ability to feign speech disorganization. 
Like other methods for detecting feigning of symptoms of psychosis, then, there would be 
expected to be a certain percentage of false negatives not detected by a measure of symptom 
feigning focused on inability to replicate referential failures. This fact underscores the crucial 
nature of a multi-symptom, multi-method approach to malingering detection.  
The second type of pattern—i.e., where the attempt to feign a symptom was 
unsuccessful because the feigning group’s performance was distinguishable from both the 
schizophrenia and control groups,appearing overly impaired—was evident in the feigning 
group’s use of Formant inflection and performance on the cognitive task. This pattern of 
unsuccessful feigning is more consistent with response styles identified by existing malingering 
assessment tools, i.e., amplified presentation of symptom intensity (Rogers, 2008b). In 
examining patterns of Formant inflection (particularly, Local and Global F2 Inflection in the 
affective reactivity and cognitive load tasks, and Global F1 Inflection in the affective reactivity 
task), the feigning group appears, overall, to have used poor formant inflection (i.e., less tongue 
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movement-based articulation) in attempt to mimic schizophrenia symptoms. This strategy did 
distinguish the feigning group from the control group in a direction matching that distinguishing 
the schizophrenia group from the control group (i.e., less inflection). However, the feigning 
group over-exaggerated this effect, such that it also used significantly less inflection than the 
schizophrenia group. Nearly half (48%) of individuals in the feigning group reported attempting 
to feign negative symptoms, but there was no evidence that individuals who attempted to portray 
negative symptoms were able to demonstrate decreased Formant inflection. Interestingly, those 
who reported an attempt to portray negative symptoms used significantly more Local F2 
Inflection in the unpleasant/high arousal affective reactivity condition compared to those who did 
not, and used more Local F2 Inflection in the high cognitive load condition, and the 
pleasant/high arousal and unpleasant/low arousal affective load conditions, at a trend level. Thus, 
it is unclear what negative speech symptoms those who endorsed portrayal of such symptoms 
were attempting to display. In any event, individuals in the feigning group tended, as a whole, to 
overshoot the mark, thereby indicating intentional under-articulation at a level exceeding even 
that typically observed among individuals with schizophrenia.  
Similarly, the feigning group distinguished itself from both the schizophrenia and 
control groups by performing poorly across cognitive performance variables (d’ and ln(β)) in a 
manner that indicated significantly lower accuracy than was evident even within the 
schizophrenia group (see also Kertzman, et al., 2006; Melinder & Barch, 2003), as well as a 
more liberal response bias.This is consistent with prior research finding that individuals feigning 
psychosis frequently also attempt to feign cognitive impairment (Resnick & Knoll, 2008). There 
were no significant differences between individuals in the feigning group who reported 
attempting to feign cognitive symptoms (53%) and those who did not on these variables. There 
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were also no significant relationships between overall confidence in successful feigning of 
symptoms and any cognitive performance variables. Thus, feigning participants were neither 
accurate in their perceptions of whether they actually demonstrated this (unsuccessful) feigning 
strategy, nor confident in their ability to successfully do so.  
The third type of pattern—i.e., where the attempt to feign a symptom was 
unsuccessful because the feigning group failed to demonstrate the expected pattern of change 
across cognitive load conditions as demonstrated by both schizophrenia and control groups—was 
evident in cognitive task performance accuracy (d’). The schizophrenia and control groups’ d’ 
scores decreased as cognitive task difficulty increased. By contrast, the feigning group simply 
performed poorly across both levels of item difficulty, at a magnitude that was unrealistic even 
for individuals with symptoms cognitive impairment typically found in schizophrenia. This 
pattern is consistent with prior findings of Kertzman, et al. (2006). Identification of feigning 
through this pattern of response style capitalizes on the absence of an anticipated performance 
curve and floor effect among feigners (Rogers, 2008b). In other words, genuine patients produce 
predictable patterns of increasing errors with increased item difficulty, while feigners may not 
recognize that some simple cognitive tasks could be completed by even impaired individuals, 
and tend to demonstrate less of a distinction between items based on difficulty. As noted above, 
feigning participants were neither accurate in their perceptions of whether they actually 
demonstrated this (unsuccessful) feigning strategy, nor confident in their ability to successfully 
do so. 
The fourth type of pattern—i.e., where the attempt to feign a symptom was 
successful because the performance of the feigning group resembled that of the schizophrenia 
group, and both the feigning group and schizophrenia group were distinguishable from 
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controls—was evident in the pattern of pause use across both the affective reactivity and 
cognitive load tasks. In both tasks, the control group used significantly more pauses, with a 
shorter mean pause length, than either the schizophrenia or feigning groups.  In other words, the 
feigning group was able to successfully resemble the schizophrenia group in its use of longer 
(and conversely fewer overall) pauses, thereby mimicking the schizophrenia group’s Alogia. 
Furthermore, while the control group demonstrated a significant increase in pause-related Alogia 
as the cognitive task moved from a lower to a higher level of difficulty, the schizophrenia and 
feigning groups both demonstrated a significant increase in pause-related Alogia at an earlier 
stage in the process, when the cognitive task was first introduced (as compared to the neutral free 
speech condition not accompanied by a cognitive task, i.e., the low cognitive load condition).  
Pause-based variables, however, were not related to either reported attempt to feign negative 
symptoms or overall confidence in feigning performance.  This lack of association between 
strategy and result raises the question as to what factors may have contributed to the feigning 
group’s successful use of pauses in the speech tasks, such that it was distinguishable from the 
control group but not the schizophrenia group. On one hand, it could be that pause-based 
expressivity deficits are easier than other more complex verbally-based deficits to intentionally 
and accurately mimic. On the other hand, it could be that the added effort of maintaining false 
speech compounded the cognitive load of the task for individuals in the feigning group, such that 
at least with regard to pause use they genuinely resembled the schizophrenia group without doing 
so purely through intentionally and disingenuously impaired performance (see Vrij, Granhad, 
and Porter (2010) for a discussion of the technique of imposing cognitive load during interviews 
as a means to detect deception).This interpretation would be consistent with Rogers and Knoll’s 
(2008) clinical observation that malingerers may repeat questions or answer them slowly to give 
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themselves time to generate a deceptive response. In either case, it would be advisable for 
clinicians not to consider simple pause patterns in making a clinical judgment as to the 
presentation of genuine versus feigned negative schizophrenia symptoms.  
Overall, then the results suggests a few important factors for clinicians to keep in 
mind when considering a possibly feigned presentation of psychosis. First, the presence of subtle 
verbal indications of formal thought disorder (e.g., confused references, lack of grammatical 
clarity, references that assume the listener has prior information that he or she does not) may be a 
reliable indicator of the presence of a genuine psychiatric disorder that individuals without such 
impairment are unlikely to successfully feign, even if attempting to do so. However, in order for 
this discrepancy to be observed, an individual must be placed in a situation requiring 
spontaneous generation of free speech. The high cognitive load condition did not provide such an 
opportunity, possibly due to the limited complexity of speech content under high load conditions, 
frequently resulting in category-naming style responses. Similarly, overly structured clinical 
interviews requiring only brief responses may be less effective at capturing the presence or 
absence of speech disorganization in suspected feigners than open-ended questions that require a 
more lengthy narrative description. By contrast, the cognitive load condition allowed for 
observation of excessive impairment by feigners on cognitive performance variables. Formant 
variables also revealed such a pattern of excessive impairment, which was observed across both 
speech conditions and may therefore possibly be observed under various interviewing styles. 
While negative speech symptoms were measured as higher in the schizophrenia group then the 
controls, specifically with regard to F2 Inflection, the feigning group used even less F2 Inflection 
than either other group. Therefore, extremely poor articulation, or mumbling speech, might be 
considered an additional red flag for clinicians confronted with a potential feigner. However, 
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because the significance of this variable is one of magnitude, and not simple presence or absence 
of a behavioral sign, it must be interpreted with significant caution. Moreover, while F2 
Inflection has been shown to be associated with clinician ratings of negative symptoms 
(Covington et al., 2012), it is yet unknown whether clinicians would be able to distinguish 
between the level of Formant articulation deficits displayed by a genuine schizophrenia patient 
versus a feigner based only on aural perception unassisted by technology. Additionally, it is 
again notable that increased pause length, while a behavioral sign observable in patients with 
schizophrenia, could also possibly be the result of cognitive resources strained by the demand of 
generating description of or attempting to behaviorally manifest feigned symptoms. Thus, 
clinicians with reason to suspect the presence of malingering behavior should be careful not to 
assume that the presence of lengthy pauses (e.g., increased response latency during interviewing) 
indicates the presence of genuine cognitive impairment.   
This study does have several limitations that should be considered when 
interpreting the results. First, despite participant recruitment attempts aimed at matching 
participants on demographic variables across groups (i.e., gender, ethnicity, and age), practical 
limitations of participant recruitment resulted in composition of groups that were significantly 
different across demographic variables relevant to outcome variables. Therefore, these 
demographic variables were controlled for statistically in analyses, where necessary, resulting in 
a loss of statistical power. Individuals recruited for the feigning group (community members, 
including some college students) may also simply not be representative of actual malingerers that 
might be present in a forensic or clinical setting. However, this is a general limitation of a 
simulation design, and would be expected to be addressed in the next anticipated step in a 
malingering research line, i.e., a known-groups design.  Additionally, the schizophrenia group 
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was not screened for malingering, so in part this study reflects some of the flaws inherent in the 
differential prevalence design (i.e., there may have actually been some malingerers in the patient 
group, thus the assumption cannot be made that the patient group was 100% “genuine”). 
However, participants in the schizophrenia group were recruited from non-forensic settings, most 
often from environments suggesting chronic symptom presentation (i.e., group living facilities). 
Furthermore, the simulation group here is composed completely of feigners, thus the magnitude 
of difference in the likely rates of malingering between the two groups is vastly different than in 
a differential prevalence design and it can be stated with greater certainty that there were more 
feigners in the simulation group than in the patient group.  Also, if there were any feigners 
present in the schizophrenia group, any differences identified by the present analyses are likely 
to be conservative with regard to their power to discriminate between feigners and true 
schizophrenia patients.  In addition, the schizophrenia group was psychiatrically medicated, an 
effect that could not be statistically controlled.  Medication side effects, therefore, could have 
increased the magnitude of negative symptoms displayed by the schizophrenia group. On the 
other hand, though, medication should improve performance on at least disorganization 
symptoms in schizophrenia. Either way, given the direction of the patterns of symptom portrayal 
by the feigning group, such effects would make the results of the present analyses more 
conservative when compared to what one might expect when comparing feigners to an un-
medicated schizophrenia group. 
Another limitation is that the control group (along with the schizophrenia group) 
was recruited as part of a larger study, and the feigning group was concurrently recruited by a 
separate procedure that referenced “faking” of symptoms in the recruitment materials. Therefore 
the assignment of community participants to the honest control and feigning groups was not truly 
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“random,” but might reflect differential interest in acting, dishonesty, etc., which could 
undermine the internal validity of the design as a simulation design. However, such a difference 
may actually be more reflective of the character of malingerers in actual forensic or clinical 
settings—i.e., those who find the idea of feigning symptoms to be something they would feel 
comfortable attempting may actually be more likely to attempt to do so. In addition, data from 
the feigning group was collected during a subset of the data collection processfor the larger study 
(i.e., for the schizophrenia and honest control groups), such that the data collection process for 
the larger study spanned almost two years (April 2010 through July 2012) whereas the data 
collection process for the feigning group spanned only seven months (November 2011 through 
May 2012). Consequently, a differential set of historical factors may have influenced the groups’ 
verbal behavior. In addition, it is possible that certain news stories about or fictional portrayals of 
individuals with mental illness highlighted in national or local public media at the time that data 
was collected from the feigning group may have specifically influenced the feigning group’s 
perceptions of mental illness, in a manner that could limit the generalizability of findings 
regarding the feigning group’s verbal behavior to other time periods or geographical locations. 
Furthermore, there are more general limitations of malingering assessment 
techniques that must be kept in mind when considering the potential future clinical application of 
this study’s results. First, like all malingering assessment techniques, this method can actually 
only suggest the presence or absence of feigning—it cannot speak to the motivation for feigning.  
It ultimately remains the clinician’s responsibility to infer whether the motivation is external 
(e.g., tangible reward or punishment avoidance), i.e., malingering, or internal (e.g., factitious 
disorder). In addition, it is important for clinicians to consider the specific style of the suspected 
malingerer and tailor assessment methods accordingly (Rogers, 2008b).  For example, examining 
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CDI differences should be limited to situations where suspected malingerers are attempting to 
actively feign positive and/or disorganization symptoms, as schizophrenia patients with 
prominent negative symptoms may not demonstrate affective reactivity in cognitive 
disorganization (although they do show significantly higher overall baseline cognitive 
disorganization as compared to controls (Cohen & Docherty, 2004)). 
Moreover, while this study supports the proposition that quantitative examination 
of certain speech-based disorganization and negative symptoms could add relevant incremental 
validity to existing malingering assessment tools, several significant hurdles would need to be 
overcome if the speech patterns discussed herein were ever to provide a future basis for 
development of a feigning assessment tool designed for use in actual clinical practice. First, it 
should be recognized that this is a preliminary examination of vocal patterns of individuals 
feigning psychosis only.  In particular, it is cautioned by Rogers(2008b) that the more complex 
method of examining spurious patterns of psychopathology (e.g., the group by condition 
interactions examined in the present study), requires extensive cross-validation. Furthermore, the 
present study’s results can only suggest variables relevant to the presence or absence of feigned 
schizophrenia.  It is as of yet unclear to what extent the present procedure suggests the presence 
of absence of other serious mental disorders that might also involve the transient experience of 
hallucinations or delusions, such as major depressive disorder (APA, 2000) or PTSD (Morrison, 
Frame, & Larkin, 2003).  Relatedly, general medical conditions, neurological disorders, and 
substance-induced psychosis would have to be ruled out before malingering could be inferred 
from these methods, because positive symptoms may be present in these instances (especially 
when visual or tactile hallucinations are prominent) without thought disorder, bizarre behavior, 
or negative symptoms (Resnick & Knoll, 2008).  In addition, while the CANS employs time-
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efficient computer-based scoring methods, the CDI requires the labor-intensive transcription of 
speech samples, and training and hand-scoring methods that are significantly more time-
consuming. Thus, the development of a more practical approach to empirical measurement of 
instances of communication disturbances in natural speech for clinical application may need to 
be considered by future researchers. 
Nonetheless, despite these limitations, the results of this study suggest a 
promising avenue of research in the area of clinical detection of malingering of psychosis. Going 
forward, it may be advisable for researchers to explore collection of speech samples of longer 
duration (Docherty, 1998, 2001), and under conditions more directly relevant to clinical 
assessment, such as responses generated during structured or semi-structured interviews aimed at 
obtaining description of distressing psychiatric symptoms. Future studies could employ a known 
groups design to examine the pattern of speech variables present among suspected malingerers in 
a clinical setting. Future research should also examine potential nuances in feigned and genuine 
schizophrenia speech patterns due to ethnic differences.  In addition, these methods should be 
explored in relation to their specificity in the detection of feigned schizophrenia symptoms, 
through examination of the performances of known groups with other serious mental illness 
(e.g., bipolar disorder).    
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APPENDIX A 
SCHIZOPHRENIA SUMMARY EXCERPTED FROM  
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH(2009) 
 
What are the symptoms of schizophrenia? 
 
The symptoms of schizophrenia fall into three broad categories: positive symptoms, negative 
symptoms, and cognitive symptoms. 
 
Positive symptoms 
 
Positive symptoms are psychotic behaviors not seen in healthy people. People with positive 
symptoms often "lose touch" with reality. These symptoms can come and go. Sometimes they 
are severe and at other times hardly noticeable, depending on whether the individual is receiving 
treatment. They include the following: 
 
Hallucinations are things a person sees, hears, smells, or feels that no one else can see, hear, 
smell, or feel. "Voices" are the most common type of hallucination in schizophrenia. Many 
people with the disorder hear voices. The voices may talk to the person about his or her behavior, 
order the person to do things, or warn the person of danger. Sometimes the voices talk to each 
other. People with schizophrenia may hear voices for a long time before family and friends 
notice the problem. 
 
Other types of hallucinations include seeing people or objects that are not there, smelling odors 
that no one else detects, and feeling things like invisible fingers touching their bodies when no 
one is near. 
 
Delusions are false beliefs that are not part of the person's culture and do not change. The person 
believes delusions even after other people prove that the beliefs are not true or logical. People 
with schizophrenia can have delusions that seem bizarre, such as believing that neighbors can 
control their behavior with magnetic waves. They may also believe that people on television are 
directing special messages to them, or that radio stations are broadcasting their thoughts aloud to 
others. Sometimes they believe they are someone else, such as a famous historical figure. They 
may have paranoid delusions and believe that others are trying to harm them, such as by 
cheating, harassing, poisoning, spying on, or plotting against them or the people they care about. 
These beliefs are called "delusions of persecution." 
 
Thought disorders are unusual or dysfunctional ways of thinking. One form of thought disorder 
is called "disorganized thinking." This is when a person has trouble organizing his or her 
thoughts or connecting them logically. They may talk in a garbled way that is hard to understand. 
Another form is called "thought blocking." This is when a person stops speaking abruptly in the 
middle of a thought. When asked why he or she stopped talking, the person may say that it felt as 
if the thought had been taken out of his or her head. Finally, a person with a thought disorder 
might make up meaningless words, or "neologisms." 
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Movement disorders may appear as agitated body movements. A person with a movement 
disorder may repeat certain motions over and over. In the other extreme, a person may become 
catatonic. Catatonia is a state in which a person does not move and does not respond to others. 
Catatonia is rare today, but it was more common when treatment for schizophrenia was not 
available.
2
 
 
"Voices" are the most common type of hallucination in schizophrenia. 
 
Negative symptoms 
 
Negative symptoms are associated with disruptions to normal emotions and behaviors. These 
symptoms are harder to recognize as part of the disorder and can be mistaken for depression or 
other conditions. These symptoms include the following: 
 
 "Flat affect" (a person's face does not move or he or she talks in a dull or monotonous 
voice) 
 Lack of pleasure in everyday life 
 Lack of ability to begin and sustain planned activities 
 Speaking little, even when forced to interact. 
 
People with negative symptoms need help with everyday tasks. They often neglect basic personal 
hygiene. This may make them seem lazy or unwilling to help themselves, but the problems are 
symptoms caused by the schizophrenia. 
 
Cognitive symptoms 
 
Cognitive symptoms are subtle. Like negative symptoms, cognitive symptoms may be difficult to 
recognize as part of the disorder. Often, they are detected only when other tests are performed.  
 
Cognitive symptoms include the following: 
 
 Poor "executive functioning" (the ability to understand information and use it to make 
decisions) 
 Trouble focusing or paying attention 
 Problems with "working memory" (the ability to use information immediately after 
learning it). 
 
Cognitive symptoms often make it hard to lead a normal life and earn a living. They can cause 
great emotional distress. 
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APPENDIX B 
NEUTRAL SPEECH TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
 
1. Tell me as much as you can about where you live.   
You can talk about what your home is like, who you live with, about your furniture and 
rooms, and anything else you can think of.  Include as many details as you can. 
 
2. Tell me as much as you can about your hobbies.   
You can talk about any hobby that you can think of, such as sports, walking, watching 
TV or anything else.  Include as many details as you can. 
 
3. Tell me as much as you can about food.   
You can talk about anything about food you can think of, such as what you like to eat, 
what food you dislike, what you like to cook and how you cook, when you eat, where you 
eat and anything else.  Include as many details as you can. 
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APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AFFECTIVE LOAD SPEECH TASK 
 
General Instructions: 
Next, I want you to tell me some stories about yourself.  I am interested in hearing about 
experiences and people from your life.  You choose what you want to talk about, but try to get 
into the story and help me experience things as you did.  
Please talk to me while concentrating on the computer screen.  That is, talk to me without 
looking at me. 
You will have 90 seconds to tell your story.  Please talk for the full time. 
 
Condition-Specific Instructions: 
Pleasant Low-Arousal Condition: 
Tell me some stories about when you were feeling really good and calm, NOT energetic/excited.  
Please get into telling this story as much as you can, and talk for 90 seconds.  
Some things to talk about include: 
1. Times you enjoyed being outside (e.g., sunset) 
2. Times when you were really relaxed 
3. Times when you felt at peace 
Unpleasant Low-Arousal Condition: 
Tell me some stories about when you were feeling really bad but NOT energetic/excited.  Please 
get into telling this story as much as you can, and talk for 90 seconds.  
Some things to talk about include: 
1. Times you felt sad or down 
2. Times when you were feeling low energy 
3. Times when you ended relationships or people/pets you know passed away. 
Pleasant High-Arousal Condition: 
Tell me some stories about when you were feeling really bad but energized.  Please get into 
telling this story as much as you can, and talk for 90 seconds.  
Some things to talk about include: 
1. Times you were really happy with someone 
2. Times when you accomplished something really special 
3. Times you were feeling at your best 
Unpleasant High-Arousal Condition:  
Tell me some stories about when you were feeling really bad but energized.  Please get into 
telling this story as much as you can, and talk for 90 seconds.  
Some things to talk about include: 
1. Times you were really furious at someone 
2. Times you were really scared 
3. Times you felt disgusted at someone or something 
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APPENDIX D 
POST-TASK QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE FEIGNING GROUP 
 
1) How confident are your performance on these tasks would have successfully convinced 
an examiner that you have schizophrenia (please indicate only one response)? 
a. Not at all confident 
b. Slightly confident 
c. Fairly confident 
d. Quite confident 
e. Very confident 
 
2) Which symptoms of schizophrenia did you focus on simulating in your attempt to 
convince the examiner that you have schizophrenia (indicate all that apply)? 
__ hallucinations 
__ delusions 
__ thought disorders 
__ negative symptoms 
__ cognitive symptoms 
__ other (please indicate________________________________________) 
 
3) In addition to the information provided by the examiner, did you rely on any other 
additional sources of information about schizophrenia in creating your strategy for 
attempting to convince the examiner that you have schizophrenia (indicate all that 
apply)?  
__ I know or have worked with someone with schizophrenia or other serious mental 
illness 
__ fictional movies or television about schizophrenia or other serious mental illness 
__ news items related to mental illness 
__ educational materials (e.g., psychology class) 
__ other (please indicate________________________________________) 
__ I relied only on the information provided by the examiner 
 
4) Please briefly summarize your strategy for attempting to convince the examiner that you 
have schizophrenia in the space provided below (you may also use the back of the page 
for additional space if necessary). 
 
 
 
114 
 
APPENDIX E 
COPY OF THE LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY INTERNAL REVIEW 
BOARD’S PROJECT APPROVAL FORM 
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